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COMMENT
THE LENGTHENING ANTI-BRIBERY LASSO
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE RECENT
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Daniel Patrick Ashe*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenarios:
(1) L is the name partner of the accounting firm KP-L located in the
country of Islandia. 1 The firm is approached by a client, Constructo
Corp. Inc., another Islandian company, which recently received an
assessment from Islandia's tax authority totaling over $3 million. KP-
L meets with Islandia's tax official, who continually demands a bribe
of $80,000. In exchange, the official promises the tax assessment will
be decreased by $2.75 million. L suggests that if Constructo Corp.'s
transnational parent company, WorldCo., Inc., based in the country of
X, but listing its securities on the New York Stock Exchange, wishes
to make the payment, KP-L can do it for them by creating a false
invoice.
KP-L communicates the plan to WorldCo.'s controller who
authorizes the scheme. KP-L pays the tax official and Constructo
receives an assessment of only $500,000. However, WorldCo.'s
compliance counsel discovers the payments and immediately contacts
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The SEC,
together with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), demand that both
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Thomas
H. Lee for his guidance, and to Serena Moe for her insights and encouragement.
Special thanks as well to my wonderful friends and familv.
1. This examtle is based on United States & S. E.C. v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta
& Harsono. United States & S.E.C. v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono,
Accountine and Auditine Enforcement Act Release No. 1446. 75 S.E.C. 1841 (Sent.
12. 2001) [hereinafter SEC's KPMG Release]. available at
http://www.sec.eov/liti-ation/litreleases/lr17127.htm, see also DOJ & SEC Complaint
Aainst KPMG-SSH, United States & S.E.C. v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta &
Harsono. Accountina and Auditina Enforcement Act Release No. 1446 (Sept. 12.
2001) [hereinafter KPMG Complaint], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/Appendices/Appendix%20I(i).pdf.
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L and his firm consent to an order enjoining them from violating, or
aiding and abetting the violation of, an anti-bribery statute of the
United States. L and his firm comply with the demands of the SEC
and the DOJ.
(2) Oil Co., Inc., a subsidiary of Worldwide Corp., is based in
Spotland and does business in Norovia, a developing nation plagued
by corruption.2 Worldwide Corp. is based in the country of Northland
but lists securities on the New York Stock Exchange, and has another
subsidiary, Petrol Co., based in the U.S. Together, the two
subsidiaries, under pressure from state oil officials in Norovia, provide
lavish gifts, trips, and large amounts of cash to the officials while
bidding for oil rights. All in all, the value of wealth transferred
exceeds $1 million.
Years later, while conducting due diligence in an effort to sell the
two subsidiaries, Worldwide discovers the payments and contacts the
SEC.3  Though no specific activity on the part of Oil Co. or
Worldwide is alleged to have taken place in the United States, the
DOJ nonetheless brings criminal charges seeking fines in excess of $10
million. Oil Co., Petrol Co., and Worldwide plead guilty, disgorge the
illicit profits, and pay penalties.4
How does American law enforcement bring such legal action to
bear against foreign nationals and foreign corporations for conduct
taking place abroad?
In 1977 President Jimmy Carter signed the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act ("FCPA")5 into law,6 curtailing the ability of American
corporate interests to bribe foreign officials to secure business.
Initially, the FCPA only applied to American domestic concerns;
Congress was leery of exercising jurisdiction even over the foreign
2. This scenario is based upon S.E.C. v. ABB Ltd. S.E.C. v. Abb Ltd.,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 2049, 83 S.E.C. 849 (July 6,
2004) [hereinafter SEC ABB Release], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18775.htm; see also SEC's Complaint
Against ABB, S.E.C. v. ABB Ltd., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act
Release No. 2049 (July 6, 2004) [hereinafter ABB Complaint], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18775.pdf.
3. See Janet K. Kim, Law Update: Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-
Corruption Laws, at http://www.prime-
tass.com/news/show.asp?topicid=76&id=365099 (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
4. See SEC ABB Release, supra note 2.
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494,
amended by Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Tit. V, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1415, §§ 1415-1425, amended by The International
Antibribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2), -(3), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2000)).
6. See Pierre Charpi&, International Business Transactions: Introduction to the
International Anti-Bribery Laws 44 (2003).
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subsidiaries of American corporations,7 let alone wholly foreign-
owned companies, their subsidiaries, and their agents because of the
"inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties."8
Nevertheless, enacting the FCPA evinced Congress's intention to
reach conduct beyond the borders of the United States.9 Thus, even
when the FCPA only applied to American businesses," the Act was
subjected to critiques of moral imperialism and jurisdictional
overreaching because it was seen as effectively holding foreign
business practices to western ethical standards."
After more than twenty years, the FCPA, as amended in 1998, has
expanded into the international sphere to such an extent that the SEC
and the DOJ have jointly levied charges against both foreign business
entities," as well as foreign nationals, 3 for the bribery of public
officials in their own country," as well as those of other foreign
nations, 5 even when the seemingly material acts have taken place
outside the United States.16 Accordingly, critics continue to fault the
FCPA's broad scope as exceeding the jurisdictional power of the
U.S. 7 and, given the culturally sensitive nature of bribery, as
becoming, more so than ever, unwisely intrusive. 8 Others, however,
find the broad anti-bribery efforts of the United States a necessary
ingredient in combating a disturbing global problem that will only
worsen if wealthy, exporting nations fail to police the supply-side of
international bribery. 9
7. See Claudius 0. Sokenu, Commentary: SEC Expands Foreign Corruption
Law Beyond Congressional Intent, Andrews Derivatives Litig. Rep. 10, Aug. 26, 2002,
WL 8 No. 19 ANDERLR 10.
8. H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed Its
Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 239, 293 n.203 (2001) (quoting from S. Rep.
No. 114, at 13 (1977)).
9. See Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar
Crime, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 325,332 (1997).
10. See Brown, supra note 8, at 259-61.
11. See Stephen R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229, 275 (1997). "[Tlhe
United States must recognize that foreign practices and policies reflect delicate
political balances that a foreign government may be unable or unwilling to disturb."
Patricia I. Hansen, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 96 Yale L.J. 1122, 1128 (1987).
12. See SEC ABB Release. sura note 2.
13. See KPMG Complaint, supra note 1 (filing a ioint action by the SEC and DOJ
seeking to enioin violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") bv foreign
accounting firm and one of that firm's name partners who enabled bribery scheme
involving the foreign subsidiary of an American multinational).
14. See id.
15. See ABB Complaint. supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., KPMG Complaint, supra note 1.
17. See Brown, supra note 8, at 359.
18. See Salbu, supra note 11, at 283-85.
19. See infra Part I.D.2.
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The Office of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention") 21 contains
an expansive jurisdictional mandate,2' the ratification of which
required the equally expansive 1998 amendments to the FCPA.22
Accordingly, resolving the appropriateness of recent FCPA
enforcement requires an examination of the rationale behind the
expansive scope of the OECD Convention, implemented by over
thirty nations,23 and whether the mechanisms that enable the U.S. to
enforce the FCPA abroad reasonably limit its enforcement so as to
ameliorate criticisms of cultural intrusion upon marginal conduct and
undue interference in the affairs of foreign nations.
Part L.A of this Comment details the general provisions of the
FCPA, the context of its enactment, and subsequent history. Part I.B
discusses the long road to the OECD Convention, including the
emerging awareness of the disastrous effects of corruption and how
this awareness made anti-bribery efforts on an international level
politically possible. Part I.C sets forth common enforcement
agreements the U.S. has created with fellow nations which are often
employed in FCPA enforcement actions abroad. Part I.D then
introduces various arguments for, and critiques of, the FCPA. Part II
presents recent FCPA actions which demonstrate the aggressive
jurisdiction and renewed anti-bribery vigor on the part of the United
States as well as both the relevant concerns raised by, and arguments
supportive of, such actions. In Part III, this Comment argues that in
spite of the fears of moral imperialism and sovereign infringement, the
U.S.'s aggressive enforcement is a necessary and ultimately beneficial
engagement with the ill of international public corruption as the
cooperative arrangements secured by the U.S. sufficiently offset
relevant objections.
I. THE FCPA: THREE DECADES IN THE MAKING
Looked at in isolation, the recent actions on the part of the SEC
and the DOJ might appear unwarranted, unexpected, and unduly
aggressive. In order to better understand these enforcement actions it
is important to provide a fuller domestic and international context.
20. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD
Convention].
21. Id. at 10.
22. See Brown, supra note 8, at 240.
23. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce Int'l Trade Admin., Addressing the Challenges
of International Bribery and Fair Competition 2004, The Sixth Annual Report Under
Section 6 of the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Table
1: Ratification Status of Signatory Countries to the OECD Antibribery Convention
10 (July 2004) [hereinafter Addressing the Challenges], available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/Publications/pdf/bribery2004.pdf.
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Part L.A begins with the arrangement of the FCPA, followed by the
Act's background and history. Part I.B then describes how the
evolving view of international public corruption made greater
international agreement on the subject possible. In Part I.C, this
Comment describes how basic information-sharing agreements
employed by U.S. law enforcement in the FCPA context create an
opportunity for greater extraterritorial enforcement. In response, Part
I.D then briefly presents pertinent issues surrounding this
extraterritorial expansion of the Act.
A. Structure, Background, and History of the FCPA
1. Structure of the FCPA
The FCPA criminalizes the bribery of foreign officials by U.S.
corporations and individuals seeking, or engaging in, business
abroad,24 and requires public companies to meet generally accepted
accounting practices,25 maintain accurate books and records,26 and
implement sufficient internal control mechanisms to guard against
illicit payments.27
As originally enacted, the anti-bribery provisions only covered
issuers of various securities regulated by the SEC,28 including
American Depository Receipts ("ADRs"), 19  and "domestic
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2000).
25. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
26. The accounting and financial controls only apply to companies whose stock is
registered with the SEC, and corporations who are required to file reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), for example, foreign corporations
who file American Depository Receipts ("ADRs"). § 78c(a)(8). The generally
accepted accounting standards ensure that questionable payments cannot be hidden.
"It was the SEC Enforcement Director's view that if public corporations were
required to keep accurate books and records subject to scrutiny by auditors and
others, those corporations would 'think twice' before accurately recording the
payment of bribes on their books." Brown, supra note 8, at 250-51. "Accordingly, the
standard for compliance with the FCPA accounting provisions is not one of
materiality, as are other securities law disclosure requirements... [but] one of
reasonable accuracy." Id. at 251-52.
27. The internal financial controls ensure management's awareness of the disposal
of assets, thereby "preventing the creation of off-the-books 'slush funds' or the
disbursement of corporate funds as bribes contrary to company policy and
management's direction." Brown, supra note 8, at 255. Notably, "no proof of
intent.., is required to establish liability under the accounting and controls
provisions... [although] the SEC has stated that only instances of knowing or
reckless conduct will be prosecuted." Id. at 258. But see infra Part II.A (discussing
SEC enforcement action which seems to indicate the SEC's willingness to move
towards a strict liability theory).
28. § 78dd-1(a).
29. ADRs represent set numbers of shares in a foreign company that are traded
on the New York Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq, and the American Stock Exchange
requiring registration and compliance with the SEC. See Investopedia.com, American
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concerns," that is, all U.S. persons and business entities.3° Jurisdiction
lay by use of the mails or means of interstate commerce. 31 But, after
the 1998 amendments, the Act was expanded to cover Americans
abroad having no interstate commerce connection, with jurisdiction
premised purely by nationality.32  Further, under the 1998
amendments,33 "any person," that is, a foreign person, natural or
otherwise, who performs an "act in furtherance" of a prohibited
bribery scheme while in the territory of the United States is subject to
the Act's strictures.34
The Act defines the prohibited conduct as follows: Directly or
through an intermediary, a covered party is not allowed to offer,
authorize a payment, or pay anything of value to foreign public
officials or candidates for public office in order to secure or retain
business. 35
Following the 1998 amendments, bribes to officials of international
organizations, such as the United Nations, became proscribed,
expanding the rubric of "public official."36 And again, as broadened
in 1998, the Act covers illicit payments or gifts given to secure "any
improper advantage,' 37 not simply to obtain or retain business.
2. Background and History of the FCPA
Following the Watergate scandal,38 federal investigations discovered
off-record "slush funds" used by U.S. multinationals to finance
Depository Receipt-ADR, at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/adr.asp (last
visited Mar. 8, 2005).
30. § 78dd-2(a).
[A]ny individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States,
and any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under
the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or
commonwealth of the United States.
§ 78dd-2(h).
31. § 78dd(a). Actual employment of the U.S. mails need only be a reasonably
foreseeable event, not an act carried out by the person accused. See Brown, supra
note 8, at 310. Moreover, instrumentalities or means of interstate commerce consider
telecommunications systems, even if used intrastate, to be part of an interconnected
system; it is not necessary for the party to have actually used such, only that such use
was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 315.
32. § 78dd-l(g), -2(i).
33. The International Antibribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-lto -
3, 78ff (2000)).
34. § 78dd-3.
35. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a).
36. § 78dd-l(f)(1), -2(h)(2).
37. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a).
38. See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 345, 348-52 (2000); Peter W. Schroth, The United States and
the International Bribery Conventions, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 593, 593-96 (Supp. 2002).
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political elections in the United States,39 as well as to bribe officials of
foreign governments to procure and sustain lucrative business
arrangements.4 0 These investigations "led to admissions to the SEC of
foreign bribery totaling over $300 million by over 400 American
corporations, of which 177 ranked in the Fortune 500."'
In 1977, in a fairly moral rejoinder, 2 a unanimous Congress enacted
the FCPA and initiated its lone fight against corrupt foreign business
practices. 3 Though the primary goal in enacting the FCPA was only
to curb U.S. businesses' disgraceful conduct, not, per se, to end
corporate corruption worldwide, there was the belief that other
nations would eagerly follow suit.4 Other concerns were the adverse,
tarnishing consequences for American business45 and U.S. foreign
39. See Political Contributions to Foreign Governments: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Multinational Corps. of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong. 5
(1975), microformed on CIS No. 76-S381-6 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
40. See Schroth, supra note 38, at 598-99. Among the more notable bribe
recipients, the Prime Minister of Japan received $4 million from Lockheed Martin.
See Tim Weiner, Lockheed and the Future of Warfare, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2004, § 3,
at 1 ("'Without Lockheed, there never would have been a Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act,' said Jerome Levinson, who was the staff director of the Senate subcommittee
that uncovered the bribery.").
The Lockheed Company actually bribed the Prime Minister of Japan twice
in one day in order to get All Nippon Airways to purchase Lockheed planes.
Some of the money was brought in an orange crate by an ex-Argentine
Jesuit of Greek descent. Funds were also paid to Franz Joseph Strauss in
Germany and the Prince of the Netherlands. Fortunately, the Prince was
wise enough to have the money paid to the World Wildlife Foundation.
These stories demonstrate that the FCPA resulted from a series of
outrageous overseas transactions.
Endy Zemenides et al., LPIB Roundtable on Global Corruption, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 195,197 (1999) (comments of Pat Head).
41. Schroth, supra note 38, at 595.
42. See Charpi6, supra note 6, at 7-8; Posadas, supra note 38, at 352-57.
By dealing with the foreign payments issue in the aftermath of Watergate,
Congress strengthened its commitment to transparency as the best means to
address conduct that, if not clearly illegal, was surely reprehensible. Because
the foreign payments hearings revealed numerous international illicit
practices rather than a small number of isolated cases, Congress ultimately
chose to criminalize foreign bribery on moral grounds.
Id. at 357.
43. See Charpid, supra note 6, at 7-8; Posadas, supra note 38, at 352-57.
44. See Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 210 (comments of Eleanor Roberts
Lewis). "It seems sort of humorous now, but when the United States passed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the late 1970's, we actually thought that other
countries would immediately want to run around and pass similar statutes." Id.
45. See Charpid, supra note 6, at 45 (citing Business Accounting and Foreign Trade
Simplification Act: Hearings on S. 430 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and
Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1986); H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 5 (1977)).
Charpi6 states that:
Congress believed that the bribery of foreign officials by some American
companies created a shadow on all U.S. companies. From a foreign policy
perspective, the American legislature felt that corporate bribery created
severe problems for the United States, as the revelation of bribe payments
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policy.46  Conversely, Congress believed that as globalization
accelerated, American business would benefit from the goodwill
associated with upright commercial practices.47 Moreover, Congress
perceived that pervasive bribery distorted market forces as efficiency
and quality yielded to illicit inducements, contrary to American ideals
of free-market efficiency.48 It was also thought that such unsuitable
behavior deteriorates both the integrity as well as the skill of
American business as it competes unlawfully rather than
meritoriously.49
However, "[s]ince the passage of the FCPA, American businesses
have operated at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who
have continued to pay bribes without fear of penalty. Such bribery is
estimated to affect overseas procurements valued in the billions of
dollars each year."5
invariably tended to embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem for
the United States among the citizens of foreign nations, and lent credence to
the suspicion sown by America's foreign opponents that US companies
exerted corrupt influences on the political processes of their countries.
Id. at 45 n.17 (citations omitted).
46. See id. at 44.
47. Cf. Posadas, supra note 38, at 355-56 (noting that the SEC believed that in the
long run, investigations into corrupt corporate activity would "help to improve the
system, as they would lead to the strengthening of corporate management and public
confidence in business").
48. See Charpid, supra note 6, at 46.
49. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 665, 675 n.29 (2004).
The most frequently mentioned reason for the shift in position of some
American multinationals is that they had come to see overseas bribery as
corrosive of their corporate culture at home. If company employees
believed that bribery in developing countries was tolerated, they might be
disposed towards bribery or other illegal activities at home. It also seems
likely that many business lobbyists had concluded that they were very
unlikely to get significant modifications of the FCPA: If the 1988 changes
were all they could extract during a business-responsive Reagan
administration, repeal was just not in the cards. Finally, there were
occasional hints-albeit circumspectly stated ones-that American
businesses had found the "going rate" for bribes to have risen substantially,
thereby reducing to near-zero the rents from bribing. If true, this fact could
have provided further incentive to American companies to give greater
international prominence to the issue, even at the risk of provoking more
assertive investigation by U.S. authorities of possible illicit payments by
American companies.
Id.; cf. Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 200 (comments of Fritz Ermath) (noting
that in Russia, rampant corruption turns otherwise honest people corrupt in order to
participate commercially because "that is the way the system works").
50. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, The International Anti-
Bribery Act of 1998, S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998). Some critics argue the real
effects of the FCPA on U.S. business are neliiible. See. e.z.. 131 Coni,. Rec. 32,763
(1985) (statement of Sen. Danforth) ( discussing, the Trade Enhancement Act and
arguinp that the FCPA was not trulv hamoering U.S. exoorters): Mark Romaneski.
The Foreizn Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future. 5
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 405, 429-30 (1982) (pointing out that in regards to the
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Thus, from the beginning, the unilateral burden 51 placed upon
American business motivated the U.S. government to seek an
international accord on corporate bribery that had yet to materialize. 2
Complicating the one-sided nature of the Act, the FCPA has long
been, and is still,53 considered overly vague,54 making the prospect of
SEC's request for information from business interests as to the impact of the FCPA,
"the SEC received onlv a modicum of response... indicat[ingl that corporate
boardrooms are not suffering from any inability to compete due to the FCPA").
Others. however. disagree, and view the FCPA as the "harshest, most comprehensive
effort" to combat corrupt payments to foreign public officials. Bruce Seymour, Illicit
Payments in International Business: National Legislation, International Codes of
Conduct, and the Proposed United Nations Convention, in Legal Problems of Codes of
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises 3. 223 (Norbert Horn ed.. 1980): see. e.z.
Robert James Gareis & William Joseph Linklaetter. The Foreien Corrupt Practices
Act: A Prazmatic Analvsis, in International Trade: Avoiding Criminal Risks § 13-9 to
-10 (W.M. Hannav ed.. 1991): Marlise Simons. U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to
End Business Bribes. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10 ("Large American
companies, including General Electric and Boeing, have openlv complained that they
have difficulty competing for contracts with European rivals who are free to use
bribes.").
51. See Seymour. supra note 50. at 219. 221: see also Gareis & Linklaetter. supra
note 50 § 13-9 to -10. But see 131 Cong. Rec. 32,763 (1985) (statement of Sen.
Danforth) ( discussing the Trade Enhancement Act and suggesting the FCPA was not
truly hampering U.S. exporters).
52. See Charpi6, supra note 6, at 22.
53. See Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 198 (comments of Pat Head).
The most difficult issue is how to handle a borderline violation... For
example, a borderline violation might occur when you have an agent who
receives a fifteen percent rather than a five percent commission. In this
situation, you have to look at the agent and see if there is anything unusual.
Another borderline violation might occur when children of foreign officials
are hired. The question then becomes whether it was a legitimate hiring or
not. The legality of other situations remains uncertain. For example,
bringing people from foreign governments to inspect your equipment might
not be legal in some situations. One area of controversy is the so-called
grease or facilitating payments. Most major corporations currently have
internal panels that review grease payments. The rule of thumb is that any
amount under $5,000 is deemed legal. However, there may be an
accumulation of payments that equals or exceeds $5,000. These payments
are usually made to get something done that normally should be done for
you. For example, your return is on the bottom of the pile with the local
internal revenue agency. Another example is when you are testing a product
that you are trying to sell, and your product might not get tested if people do
not get taken care of in a minor way. Most companies have a clearinghouse
for the issuance of grease payments, so this is usually resolved in an
acceptable manner.
Id.
54. See 134 Cong. Rec. S2589-90 (daily ed. Mar. 18. 1988) (statement of Sen.
Heinz). Senator Heinz stated as follows: "The burden of the U.S. trade deficit has
enormous negative effects on the American economy, and it is clear that we have to
do a better job of clearing awav obstacles to export performance improvements,
including ambiguities in the FCPA that discourage our exporters."
Id.
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enforcement a difficult issue to gauge.55 To address both the
unilateral application as well as the scope of the Act, Congress first
amended the FCPA in 1988.56
a. Narrowing the FCPA and Calling for a Level Playing Field: The
1988 Amendments
Under sustained pressure by critics blaming Congress for unduly
harming American business,57 "Congress amended the FCPA in 1988,
[making] its views explicit concerning the necessity of an international
response to foreign bribery." 8  Part of the aptly named Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,19 the amendment formally
called upon the President to pursue an international agreement
whereby other nations would enact statutes similar to the FCPA.6 °
Addressing the scope of the Act, the 1988 amendment created
exceptions for so-called "grease payments":61 small disbursements for
routine government actions such as licensing, obtaining permits or
official documents, and processing papers such as visas or work
orders.62 Moreover, the amendment allowed an affirmative defense if
the payment to the foreign public official was lawful in the jurisdiction
of the bribe recipient.63 The 1988 amendments also created an
affirmative defense for reasonable expenses directly related to
legitimate promotional activities.'
55. See Alan Swan & John Murphv, Cases and Materials on the Regulation of
International Business and Economic Relations, 263-73, 277-84 (1991 documentary
supplement); Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to
Include a Private Rizht of Action. 82 Cal. L. Rev. 185. 195 (1994) ("Without clearly
defined terms and recuirements, the FCPA proves ineffective in providing guidance
for U.S. corporations.").
56. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
57. See Laura E. Loneobardi. Reviewinz the Situation: What Is to Be Done with
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 431 (1987).
58. Brown, supra note 8, at 264.
59. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1, dd-2, dd-3
(2000)).
60. See Charpid, supra note 6, at 22-23 (noting that the amendment requires the
President to report to Congress on the state of negotiations, as well as other
possibilities for cooperation to combat international public bribery).
61. § 78dd-1, -2(b).
62. See Alan Cohen, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1176 Practicing L. Inst. 475,
490 (2000), available at WL 1176 PLI/Corp 475.
63. § 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1). "There have been no cases or Opinion Releases that
explicitly addressed this defense, nor has it been raised in any FCPA prosecution of
which we are aware." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Response of the U.S.: Questions
Concerning Phase 2, § 4.1(c), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/PhaseII.htm
(last visited Mar. 8, 2005). This may indicate that minimal actions have not been
targeted by FCPA enforcement. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
64. § 78dd-1(c)(2),-2(c)(2).
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b. Post-1988 Amendments- Continuing to Seek an International Anti-
Bribery Agreement
While the FCPA's success in curbing American corporate bribery
during this period is arguable,65 nevertheless the anti-bribery statute
''unequivocally entered the business culture of American companies
operating internationally"" as evidenced by "[tihe American business
community's strong interest in extending FCPA disciplines abroad."67
Thus, it seems the FCPA was able to deter and alter, to a greater or
lesser degree, American business interests abroad.'
On the international front, however, reluctance continued on the
part of fellow exporting nations to combat global bribery. 69 European
nations proved particularly problematic,7" some even continuing to
encourage corrupt practices by making foreign bribery a tax-
deductible business expense.7
65. See Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 198-99 (comments of Pat Head).
66. Posadas, supra note 38, at 358.
67. Id. at 358-59.
68. Id.
On balance, the Act has done a lot of good because business will not often
police itself unless there is some established standard. I think the Act has
accomplished that. Has it really stopped bribery around the world by U.S.
companies? I doubt it. The competition from others, up until the OECD
agreement, was too extensive. The OECD agreement is changing the
spectrum. Still, the point I have made to senior executives is that bribery is a
dangerous and criminal act. Even if the corporation is only caught a few
times, it is the reputation of the corporation that is hurt, and the individuals
involved can be destroyed.
Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 199 (comments of Pat Head).
69. See Mark J. Murphy, Note, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair
Trade Practice?, 21 Brook. J. Int'l L. 385, 393-97 (1995); see also Charpid, supra note
6, at 8.
The Europeans' initial reaction to the American FCPA was bemused
incredulity. They were skeptical of the law and regarded it as a quaint
outbreak of Puritanism and naivetd on the part of the United States.
Therefore, in essence, America had little support for its solitary war against
international bribery after it enacted the law.
Id.; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 261-62 (stating that when Congress directed the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations at the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") in the late 1970's to initiate negotiations on anti-bribery, the
proposal was met with "polite silence").
70. See Seymour Rubin, International Aspects of the Control of Illicit Payments, 9
Svracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 315. 321 (1982).
71. See Joseph F. Savace et al.. New Amendments to the Foreiizn Corrupt Practices
Act Broaden Its Scope as Enforcement Increases. White-Collar Crime Rep. Julv-Au,.
1999. at 5 n.10 (citine David Ivanovich. Cuttine Off Corruption's Supplv Side: More
Nations Join U.S. War on Bribery, Houston Chron., Oct. 30, 1998, at Business 1).
Indeed:
As recently as 1996. fourteen of the twentv-nine members of the OECD
allowed companies to declare bribes a business expense. Companies in
Germanv. for example, were declarine more than $5 billion in expenses for
pavoffs. Meanwhile, since 1994. alleeations of bribery bv forein companies
have been raised regarding 240 international commercial contracts worth
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Accordingly, during the period of quickening globalization of the
late 1980s and 1990s, without an international agreement in place,
U.S. interests were suffering significantly despite the 1988
amendments, 72 especially in emerging markets. U.S. efforts to get
the international community on board continued through the 1990s.74
B. The Evolving View of Public Corruption: Greater International
Agreement on Anti-Bribery Legislation and the 1998 Amendments to
the FCPA
As early as 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution condemning corrupt practices,75 but its action lacked force
and was largely ineffectual.76 At that time, there had not yet
developed public support for aggressive anti-bribery efforts.77
Later, the United States' proposal that the United Nations
Economic and Social Council adopt a code banning bribery in
international business was met with "deafening silence. ' '78 Despite the
Economic and Social Council's creation of an Ad Hoc Inter-
Governmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices, the proposal
that that group subsequently produced was rejected because the
$108 billion...
... [niot only are bribery pavments a cost of doing business, but a rising cost
as well. In Italv. for example, payoffs to political parties have risen from five
to 15% of a contract's value.
Id. (citations omitted). Despite briberv's rising cost, competitors of U.S. businesses
who bribe still tend to succeed over U.S. interests in bidding for foreign contracts:
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce officials, of 61 contracts it
examined. U.S. companies lost 13 of them, worth $3 billion, due to bribes bv
foreign companies. Some government officials believe the value lost each
vear is $20 billion to $30 billion. They assert that companies providing
bribes win the contract 90% of the time.
Id. at 2.
72. See, e.e.. Continued Official U.S. Pressure Called Kev to Winnino Kuwait
Reconstruction Contracts. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. 472 (1991) (stating that U.S. companies
are disadvantaged because the Middle East business climate favors bribes): Marlise
Simons. U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes. N.Y. Times, Apr.
12, 1996. at A10 (stating that U.S. Trade Representative Michael Kantor believed
that, based on a 1995 report, losses for that year were $45 billion in contracts alone).
73. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Introduction, 18 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 1153, 1157
(1997).
74. See Addressing the Challenges, supra note 23, at 4.
75. See Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other
Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved, G.A. Res. 3514, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., 2441st plen. mtg. (1975), U.N. Doc. A/10034, reprinted in 15
United Nations Resolutions (1974-1976), at 509-10 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1984).
76. See Charpi6, supra note 6, at 16 (citing Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty
on the Prevention of International Corrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Is Not the Answer, 1 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 10-11 (1995)).
77. Id.
78. See Rubin, supra note 70, at 319-20.
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United States was unable to garner support from its European allies.79
Efforts in the OECD had proved equally unavailing.8"
However, the rapidly-evolving global environment of the 1990s
bolstered U.S. efforts. With the Cold War coming to an end,
democratic governments with greater transparency were spreading
across the globe, rendering corruption more visible." Concomitantly,
the expectation of enhanced government accountability followed the
international expansion of freedom of the press8 2 and more
independent prosecutors and judges.8 3 These fundamental changes set
the stage for a shift in how the international audience perceived
bribery.84
1. The Changed Perception of Corruption
The view that corruption was a mere externality "necessary" to
achieve growth85 eventually gave way to the view that corruption was
ruinous.8 6 Early commentators had posited that corrupt channels
79. See id. at 321.
80. See Murphy, supra note 69, at 387-88.
81. See OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 105th Cong. 55 (1998) [hereinafter Heimann Testimony] (testimony of Fritz
F. Heimann, Chairman, Transparency International USA).
82. For example, critical press coverage played a significant role in bringing to an
end the corrupt Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia. See Zemenides et al., supra note
40, at 205-07 (comments of Joseph Onek).
83. See Heimann Testimony, supra note 81, at 55.
84. See id.
Political corruption became one of the "hot" foreign policy topics of the
1990s, in contrast to the period before 1990 when political corruption
appeared of little concern to the international community. Robert
McNamara, former President of the World Bank, asserted in the early-1990s
that "the subject of corruption could not have been discussed [in
international forums] 20, 15, or even 5 years ago".... In the post-Cold War
1990s, the democratization trends in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the
former Soviet bloc, combined with advances toward global free trade,
brought the efficiencies of state political and economic systems under world
microscopes-revealing the underlying web of corruption pervading
developing states.
Michael W. Collier, Explaining Political Corruption (Colum. Int'l Aff. Online,
Working Paper, 1999) (citations omitted), at http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/com01/.
85. This school of thought adhered to the view that "the definitions of corruption
and bribery varied with societal values and inherited cultural and religious traditions,
and... an increase in the incidence of corruption and bribery was a necessary and
inevitable part of the modernization process." Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of
Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current
Crusade Against Corruption, 33 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 877, 897 (2000). Some posited
that, because "corruption" was contextually based, what Westerners perceived as
corrupt might simply be "their traditional way of doing things." Id. at 898; see also
Gerald E. Caiden & Naomi J. Caiden, Administrative Corruption, 37 Pub. Admin.
Rev. 301, 304 (1977).
86. See Tarullo, supra note 49, at 675 ("Instead of regarding bribery as a means
for getting things done in rigid bureaucracies, by the 1990s, development economists
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could in fact be beneficial as they allowed companies and individuals
to circumvent inefficient and onerous regulatory burdens and taxes."
Considerable attention and research,8" however, challenged this
view.89 Studies published in the late 1990s found empirical evidence
that corruption severely affected GDP and foreign investment,90
diverting monies destined for socially valuable products or
infrastructure into the pockets of officials.9 Gradually, the effects of
global corruption9 2 came to be perceived as more than mere
unfortunate by-products, and instead as more akin to "an
international epidemic, similar in impact to disease and terrorism."93
The evidence reflecting the greater than expected harm wrought by
corruption was not the only catalyst for the changing perspective on
international corruption. Perhaps most significantly, highly publicized
bribery scandals in nations like Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, France, and
Belgium garnered support for the OECD Convention effort 94 by
removing "the common excuse for inaction," 95 namely, "that
were characterizing corruption as one of the principle impediments to both economic
growth and democratic accountability."); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, The
Political Economy of Corruption, in Corruption and the Global Economy 31, 33
(Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (arguing that toleration of corruption in a growing
economy leads to higher percentages of wealth going to bribery and greater inequality
between haves and have-nots).
87. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 55-56.
88. See Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International Corruption
Regime and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22 U. Pa. J. Int'l.
Econ. L. 863, 864 (2001); Schroth, supra note 38, at 619.
89. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy Problem:
Overview and Recommendations, in Corruption and the Global Economy, supra note
86, at 186-87.
90. See Schroth, supra note 38, at 619-20 (citations omitted).
91. See Collier, supra note 84. Michael W. Collier goes on to summarize recent
research on corruption's effects:
When it is pervasive and uncontrolled, corruption thwarts economic
development and undermines political legitimacy. Less pervasive variants
result in wasted resources, increased inequity in resource distribution, less
political competition and greater distrust of government. Creating and
exploiting opportunities for bribery at high levels of government also
increases the cost of government, distorts the allocation of government
spending, and may dangerously lower the quality of infrastructure. Even
relative petty or routine corruption can rob government of revenues, distort
economic decision making, and impose negative externalities on society,
such as dirtier air and water or unsafe buildings.
Id. (citations omitted).
92. See generally Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgmt., World Bank, Helping
Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank 5 (1997) (pointing out
bribery's long-term economic costs and the more severe harm to political legitimacy);
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86; Konyin Ajayi, On the Trail of a Spectre-
Destabilisation of Developing and Transitional Economies: A Case Study of
Corruption in Nigeria, 15 Dick. J. Int'l L. 545 (1997).
93. Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 195 (comments of Endy Zemenides).
94. See Heimann Testimony, supra note 81, at 55; see also Nichols, supra note 88,
at 896-97.
95. Heimann Testimony, supra note 81, at 55.
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corruption is a serious problem only in developing countries. 96
Global leaders began to recognize "that a global economy requires
common rules, and that these rules must be morally defensible." 97
In sum, "rtlhese factors... produced a tidal change in public
perceptions around the world."9' In terms of implementing this new
viewpoint, the explosive growth of the 1990s did more than reveal
corruption's pervasiveness. Escalating interconnectivity also made
agreements99 more pragmatically possible as the globe shrunk through
technology and trade.10
2. International Anti-Bribery Agreements Begin to Emerge
In the early 1990s the OECD began to investigate potential
cooperative actions that could be taken to outlaw transnational
bribery.10 1  The Clinton administration provided additional
motivation, demanding that the world community come to agreement
on foreign bribery.10 2
But OECD Convention member states remained hesitant.10 3 As the
beginning stages of the OECD Convention got underway, Japan,
Germany, France, and Britain sought to block the treaty," insisting
that bribery should be policed in its home state, 105 on the demand side,
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of
International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 Ariz. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 793, 805 (2001). Others believe the global change in attitude was the result
of the "hegemon United States [bullying] the rest of the world into adopting
legislation similar to [the FCPA]." Nichols, supra note 88, at 893-94 (questioning the
validity of this view because the OAS treaty is considered "the result of efforts by
Latin America," because "the European Union does not get 'bullied' by the United
States over commercial issues" such as the OECD Convention, and because the
heavily influential anti-bribery organization Transparency International "was founded
by a German national who left the World Bank, because he was not satisfied with that
organization's [anti-bribery] efforts").
99. See Henning, supra note 98, at 806; see also Frank Vogl, The Supply Side of
Global Bribery, Fin. & Dev., June 1998, at 30, 31 (noting the media's role in raising
corruption issues).
100. See Henning, supra note 98, at 806.
101. See Brown, supra note 8, at 265-68.
102. See Murphy, supra note 69, at 388 n.19. In June 1994, then-Secretary of State
Warren Christopher addressed the OECD Ministerial Meeting in Paris to reaffirm the
"'vital objective' concerning the U.S. effort 'to build an international consensus
against the bribery of foreign officials in international business transactions."' Id. at
388 n.19 (citing Warren Christopher, Toward a More Integrated World, Dep't St.
Dispatch, June 20, 1994, at 393, 395 (statement at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Ministerial Meeting, Paris, France, June 8, 1994)); see
also U.S. to seek Foreign Acceptance of Anti-Corruption Laws, Practices, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 17, at 714 (Apr. 26, 1995).
103. See Charpid, supra note 6, at 25.
104. See Muffler, supra note 76, at 13-14; Edmund L. Andrews, 29 Nations Agree to
Outlaw Bribing Foreign Officials, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1997, at Al.
105. See Salbu, supra note 11, at 286.
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not the supply-side out of respect for the affairs of fellow nations.
Perhaps entwined in this sentiment was the notion that
many OECD members were satisfied with the status quo, in which
U.S. companies were forbidden by their domestic laws from bribing
foreign officials but European and other countries were not. There
is little doubt that these other governments would gladly have
allowed the issue to fade into obscurity, but for the persistence of
the United States and the links drawn between domestic and foreign
bribery in journalistic and public discourse. 6
The OECD was not the only outlet for U.S. efforts, however.
Propelled by changed perspectives on public corruption, the
Organization of American States ("OAS"), comprised of thirty-four
countries of North, South, and Central America, called for "a
hemispheric approach to acts of corruption in both the public and
private sectors that would include extradition and prosecution of
individuals so charged.""1 7 Notably, the anti-bribery issue was high on
the agenda for southern nations, who went so far as to "suggest that
governments of developed countries.., by failing to act against
foreign bribery by their own multinationals, [are] complicit in that
bribery."' 18
Undoubtedly, this sentiment must have been "vexing to many other
OECD member governments"'0 9 such as Japan, Germany, France,
and Britain who had cited respect for sovereignty in opposing anti-
bribery legislation 10 But, for anti-bribery advocates, this "new and
vocal position of democratically elected governments in developing
countries.., removed [that] prior justification for inaction-that an
anti-bribery arrangement was an inappropriate imposition of the
values of advanced industrialized democracies upon the rest of the
world." ''
106. Tarullo, supra note 49, at 680.
[Tihe plausibility of the non-mercantile iustifications [e.g.. sovereign
infringement] for resisting international prohibitions on bribery was
progressively eroded in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Yet resistance to an
OECD agreement remained strong, a fact that lends credibility to the
mercantile explanation [whereby states align themselves with their
industries]. In 1994, one European official told me with disarmin2 candor
that his country's companies needed a competitive edge over their more
efficient U.S. competitors.
Id. at 674 n.26.
107. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec.
11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808, 818-19.
108. Tarullo, supra note 49, at 679.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111. Tarullo, supra note 49, at 679 n.38.
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The United States proposed provisions in the draft that
substantially tracked the FCPA, 12 and in 1996, delegates adopted the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption."'
Thus, with depleting excuses for inaction, unfavorable empirical
evidence, gathering public momentum, and "diplomatic skill,
forcefulness, and above all perseverance""1 4 by the United States, the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions was brought into being in
1997.115
The Convention significantly follows the original FCPA and yet
goes further. It tracks the FCPA's exception for conduct that is legal
in the jurisdiction in which the payment took place,' 16 as well as
exempting "facilitation payments.""17 Likewise, the internal controls
and accounting provisions both substantially parallel the FCPA.'18
But the Convention went further by defining "public official" as not
only "any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office
112. See Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 491, 492 (1998) (stating that "one of the
objectives of the Convention [was] to have the rest of the nations of the hemisphere
develop a body of laws on corruption comparable to that which exists in the United
States").
113. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-39, 35 I.L.M. 724 (entered into force by the United States on October
29, 2000); David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The
Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 457, 478
(1998).
114. Heimann Testimony, supra note 81, at 55.
115. See OECD Convention, supra note 20, 37 I.L.M. at 1. The Convention
entered into force February 15, 1999 upon the ratification of eighteen countries. By
the end of 2001, the OECD Convention was in force for all thirty OECD member
countries except Ireland, plus five non-member countries-Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia. Lisa M. Landmeier et al., Anti-Corruption International
Legal Developments, 36 Int'l Law. 589, 591 (2002). Regarding the subtle arm-twisting
employed by the United States while advocating the Convention, Daniel K. Tarullo
stated as follows:
One U.S. move was to communicate to its OECD negotiating partners
the message that progress on matters of interest to them would be less likely
absent progress on the anti-bribery effort. Although no issue linkage or
reciprocity was ever articulated explicitly, the message was conveyed by the
very prominence of the issue in meetings involving senior officials of the
State Department, Treasury Department, Commerce Department, and
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. In effect, U.S. officials were
saying, "We care a lot about this issue, your government has been
obstructionist, and we are not going to be very helpful on some issues of
interest to you until progress is made at the OECD."
Tarullo, supra note 49, at 677-78. A slightly different view of the same conduct:
"European Commission officials describe the zeal of U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor in his fight against international bribery as 'sanctimonious."' Salbu,
supra note 11, at 283 n.351 (citation omitted).
116. See OECD Convention, supra note 20, cmt. 8, 37 I.L.M. at 9.
117. Id cmt. 9, 37 I.L.M. at 9.
118. See id. art. 8(1), 37 I.L.M. at 9; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2000).
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of a foreign country," but also as officials or agents of "a public
international organization."119 Importantly, the territorial and
national jurisdiction1 20 that the Convention calls for far exceeds the
scope of the original FCPA.
a. Jurisdiction Under the OECD Convention
As to territorial jurisdiction, OECD Convention Members are to
"take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is
committed in whole or in part in its territory. 1 21 Contrary to general
assumptions of territorial jurisdiction, which require conduct wholly
or substantially to take place in the territory of the prosecuting
sovereign, the Convention called for the jurisdictional provision to
be "interpreted broadly [enough] so that an extensive physical
connection to the bribery act is not required." '123 The FCPA, as
amended, unquestionably follows this mandate.'24
b. Maximum Cooperation Among OECD Convention Members
The Convention likewise obligates parties "to the fullest extent
possible under its laws and relevant treaties and arrangements, to
provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party." '25
Thus, for the purposes of sharing information, "[t]he requested Party
shall inform the requesting Party, without delay, of any additional
information or documents needed to support the request for
assistance." '126 Moreover, as for prosecutions, the Convention requires
prohibited conduct to be considered an extraditable offense with the
Convention itself serving the function of an extradition treaty if such
is not in existence between the parties already.2 7
119. See OECD Convention, supra note 20, art. 1(4)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 4.
120. See id. art. 4(1)-(4), 37 IL.M. at 4; id. art. 4(1)-(4) cmts. 25-26., 37 I.L.M. at 10.
Nationality jurisdiction finds its basis upon the domicile, the residence, and the
nationality or national character of the person, natural or non-natural, committing the
offense. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402
cmt. e (1987).
121. See OECD Convention, supra note 20, art. 4(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
122. See Restatement, supra note 120, § 402.
123. OECD Convention, supra note 20, cmt. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 10.
124. See infra Parts II.A-B (discussing recent FCPA enforcement actions).
125. OECD Convention, supra note 20, art. 9(1), 37 I.L.M. at 6.
126. Id.
127. Id. art 10(2), 37 I.L.M. at 6 If extradition was denied, the party denying it
would be obligated to prosecute the individual instead. Id. "In theory at least, the
adoption of the OECD Convention [also] empowers U.S. firms to present evidence of
competitor bribery directly to the authorities in the relevant countries rather than the
pointless diplomatic and media protests of the past." Savage et al., supra note 71, at 4.
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c. The Tax Deductibility of Bribes Under the OECD Convention
Initially, the Convention did not cover the tax deductibility of
bribes. 28 However, after a reinforced recommendation by the OECD
Council, all thirty-five parties to the Convention have affirmed that
bribes paid to foreign public officials are not tax deductible.129
3. A Lack of Non-U.S. Anti-Bribery Enforcement Under the OECD
Convention
With the exception of the United States, only two other OECD
Convention Members have carried out successful prosecutions under
their anti-bribery statutes enacted pursuant to the Convention. 13 And
only four other parties have even initiated investigations or legal
proceedings: Canada,' France, Italy, and Norway.1
3 2
Unfortunately, though perhaps not unexpected because of the lack
of enforcement, 33 various evidence shows that corruption continues to
affect contracts worth billions of dollars.13 1 In fact, the incidence of
bribery is increasing:' 35 "U.S. firms are known to have lost at least
eight of the contracts, worth $3 billion" in just a recent one year
period.
136
128. H. Lowell Brown writes:
[I]n a May 1997 report to the OECD Ministerial Council, the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs noted that bribes to foreign officials were tax
deductible as a business expense under the laws of Australia, Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Portugal, and Switzerland. On April 28, 1998, the Committee
on Fiscal Affairs reported that Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands,
and Portugal had adopted or were'in the process of adopting legislation that
would deny tax deductibility to foreign bribes. In addition, Australia,
Belgium, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland were
considering similar legislation.
Brown, supra note 8, at 260 n.61 (citations omitted).
129. See Addressing the Challenges, supra note 23, at 34. Yet, "[d]espite the
important positive steps taken by parties to the convention, the U.S. government
remains concerned that tax systems that permit tax deductibility of bribes to foreign
public officials may still continue." Id. This is due, in part, to the fact that the
legislative frameworks may not adequately capture all types of bribes or bribes by all
types of companies. See id. Moreover, difficulties result from insufficient training,
unfamiliarity with the law denying tax deductibility, protections of confidentiality for
the taxpayer, and restrictions on sharing of information with prosecutors. Id. at 34-35.
130. See id. at 23 (Sweden and South Korea).
131. The prosecution in Canada was for domestic bribery carried out by a
Canadian firm: "This is not exactly the kind of overseas bribery that was foremost in
the minds of advocates of an OECD Convention." Tarullo, supra note 49, at 683.
132. See Addressing the Challenges, supra note 23, at vi.
133. See infra Part III.B.
134. Addressing the Challenges, supra note 23, at vi.
135. See id.
136. Id.
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In its Sixth Annual Report on International Bribery, the United
States expressed disappointment over the lack of enforcement.137 In
particular, the report cited fellow leading exporters who showed the
greatest reluctance in addressing the problem, 3 8 and called on "all
parties to the convention [to] apply resources to the task of building
capacity to launch investigations, bring prosecutions, and obtain
convictions under their laws."'39
C. Mechanisms of Enforcement: Bilateral Information-Sharing
Agreements
Gathering the evidence necessary to carry out an investigation
abroad is exceedingly difficult. 4 ' Indeed, if the United States was
unable to elicit cooperation from local agencies and officials,
"[s]ecuring... proof [of official bribery] in a foreign country would be
practically impossible."14' Though the OECD Convention contains
provisions for information sharing and cooperative law enforcement
obligations,4 2 not all nations from which the United States requires
assistance in foreign bribery prosecutions are parties. As a result, the
United States also employs less formal agreements while seeking
cooperation in FCPA enforcement.
143
In an effort to ensure a degree of integrity and accountability in the
burgeoning world financial system in general, the SEC has cemented
over thirty bilateral information-sharing agreements with regulators
from various nations,'" which have also been successfully employed in
the FCPA context. 14
5
Pragmatic and non-binding, such instruments do not create
obligations under international law 46 and so do not require the time
and expense of a ratification process. Every agreement is, however,
specifically negotiated with each nation in order to fit the unique
137. See Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at 589 ("Despite these recent efforts,
there have not been any significant international enforcement actions other than by
the U.S. government .... ).
138. See Addressing the Challenges, supra note 23, at 22.
139. Id.
140. See Neil H. Jacoby et al., Bribery and Extortion in World Business: A Study
of Corporate Political Payments Abroad 218 (1977).
141. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 63, § 9.2.
142. See OECD Convention, supra note 20, art.9, 37 I.L.M. at 6.
143. See Gregory S. Bruch, Recent SEC Foreign Payments Cases and the Road
Ahead Under the New SEC Leadership, A.B.A. Center for Continuing Legal Educ.,
Nat'l Inst., Mar. 21-22, 2002, available at WL N02FCPB ABA-LGLED B-151.
144. See Office of Int'l Affairs, SEC, The SEC Speaks in 2004, at 543, 552 (2004),
WL 1413 PLI/Corp 543.
145. See Bruch, supra note 143.
146. See Office of Int'l Affairs, SEC, The SEC Speaks in 1996, at 125, 165 (1996),
WL 927 PLI/Corp 125.
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conditions of that market. 147 Generally these agreements require: (1)
the exchange, upon request, of information contained in the files of
the foreign regulator; (2) the taking of testimony under oath by the
foreign regulator on behalf of the SEC; (3) inspections of regulated
persons by the foreign regulator; and (4) the sharing with the SEC of
the information and reports generated by those inspections. 141
Thus, while conducting discovery for foreign anti-bribery
enforcement remains onerous, it is now possible.149 Consequently, the
SEC relies more and more 5 ' upon such negotiated arrangements in
FCPA actions,' a practice which is likely to expand the SEC's
international efforts and keep both formal and informal cooperation
continually growing.152
D. International Issues of Law and Policy Raised by the
Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA
Until amended in 1998, the FCPA had reflected Congress's
sensitivity to "possible conflicts with principles of international law
and comity that could result from the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction
over foreign nationals outside the territorial United States."'5 3 Thus,
it has been said that "the enlargement of the extraterritorial effect of
the [FCPA's] antibribery provisions may prove to be the most
significant and challenging foray by the United States into the
regulation of international business"'54 as nearly any contact with the
United States "will subject a foreign national to prosecution in a U.S.
court."' 55
Indeed, the 1998 amendments create vicarious liability for "foreign
nationals whose employees or agents commit acts in the United States
that are in furtherance of a corrupt payment to a foreign official."' 56
This provision would apply for subsidiaries even if they are not wholly
147. See Christine T. Jarmer, Comment, International Internet Securities Fraud and
SEC Enforcement Efforts: An Update, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 2121, 2136 (1999).
148. Id. (citing Charles R. Mills et al., International Enforcement. Enforcement
Actions in the Global Market, in The Securities Enforcement Manual: Tactics and
Strategies 501 (Richard M. Phillips ed., 1997)).
149. See Bruch, supra note 143.
150. See The SEC Speaks in 2004, supra note 144, at 552. "In fiscal year 2003, the
SEC made 309 requests to foreign authorities for enforcement assistance and
responded to 344 requests from abroad." Id. at 553.
151. See Cohen, supra note 62, at 503.
152. See Bruch, supra note 143.
153. Brown, supra note 8, at 292-93.
154. Id. at 240.
155. Id. at 296.
156. Id. at 349 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a)(3) (2000)). "[U]nder the common law
principles of agency, when a natural person acting on behalf of a foreign company,
that is an officer, director, employee, stockholder or agent, engages in a corrupt act
having contact with the United States. that foreign company may be liable for that
agent's conduct." Savage et al., supra note 71, at 3.
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owned by the parent if they acted as the agent of the parent.157
Moreover, the United States has taken the position that the level of
conduct that may trigger liability under the act "includes everything
except 'merely conceiv[ing] the idea of paying a bribe without
undertaking to do so. ' ' 15
8
1. Morally Imperious and Unwisely Intrusive? Arguments Against
the FCPA
This aggressive stance is in stark contrast to critics who see such far-
flung jurisdiction as contrary to international law and only appropriate
if the "actions taken within United States territory directly and
substantially further a violation of the FCPA."'15 9 While there is no
constitutional problem,16 it is presumed that the United States
conforms to basic principles of international law."' Thus, some
commentators question the reasonableness of prosecution where the
link between the illicit conduct and United States' territory is
dangerously attenuated,'62 such as cases where a foreign party pays a
bribe to a foreign official in a foreign jurisdiction.163 In cases like
these, it is contended, the potential for political clashes is
impermissibly great. 1"4
157. See Brown, supra note 8, at 355.
158. Lucinda A. Low & Timothy P. Trenkle, U.S. Antibribery Law Goes Global,
Bus. L. Today, July-Aug. 1999, at 18 ("How broadly enforcement officials will
attempt to construe this provision will be an issue to watch closely over the next few
years.").
159. Brown, supra note 8, at 334.
160. See id. at 297.
161. See id. at 320.
162. See id. at 302.
163. See id. at 359. One could even argue that when an American entity bribes
abroad, if it were not for the FCPA, the actual effect upon the United States is slight,
and perhaps not even adverse:
The FCPA's foreign payments prohibition has always stood out insofar as
investors tend to benefit (at least in the short run) from the illegal payments
to foreign government officials. And while foreign governments may be
harmed by illicit payments from US public companies, they would not
typically be considered as "other corporate constituencies."
Bruch, supra note 143. But see Tarullo, supra note 49, at 675 n.29 (stating that corrupt
practices negatively affect corporate culture as employees engage in illegal activity).
164. See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature
Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 223, 254 (1999)
[hereinafter Salbu, Premature Evocation].
[R]egardless of how many countries eventually sign on to the present
multilateralization efforts, the attempts of one sovereign to moderate
activity within the borders of another will always pose the risk of
disagreements, resentments, and conflict. Should all the world's nations
enact extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation, the result will increase the pool
of potential international relations minefields.
Stephen Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20
Mich. J. Int'l L. 419, 445 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony].
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2. A Responsible Approach to a Global Problem? Arguments in
Favor of the FCPA
Other commentators take a different view of the international anti-
bribery efforts advanced by the United States. In support of FCPA
enforcement, proponents point to the dangers of failing to effectively
police the supply-side of corruption,165 given the interconnected
nature of the world's financial system whose effects easily circle the
globe,"' as well as America's interest in ensuring fidelity to its laws by
closing loopholes which would allow corrupt practices to be carried
out simply by delegating the bribery to foreign third parties.167
Under this view, rather than a vehicle for moral imperialism, the
provisions of the FCPA are viewed as "catalytic" in changing
"international attitudes" and providing "a functioning model" worth
replicating. 16
8
Proponents of extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation take
exception to characterizations of U.S. efforts as fruitless attempts to
elevate "all countries to the FCPA's lofty moral climate," believing
this is "unrealistic" because "[b]ribery is an intransigent global reality
that is unlikely to disappear any time soon., 1 69 Proponents counter
that no matter how rampant corruption may be, it is unlikely to be
well-received by the state's citizenry.17
Examining recent applications of the FCPA, the subject Part II,
illustrates these issues and is useful for analyzing the Act as it
presently stands.
165. See Philip M. Nichols, Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational
Bribery, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 451, 451-52 (1999).
166. See id. at 451-54.
167. See The Short Arm of the Law, Economist, Mar. 2, 2002, at 63. The article
criticizes the FCPA for loopholes that "are big enough for a half-blind elephant to
blunder through," allowing foreign subsidiaries to do the dirty work of multinationals
in jurisdictions where the host government has not signed the OECD Convention, but
notes that the KPMG-SSH enforcement action "could push the extraterritorial
ambitions of the American authorities a bit further" and thus close these openings. Id.
at 63-64.
168. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of
Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and
International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 1, 47 (1999).
169. Salbu, supra note 11, at 262.
170. See Bill Shaw, The Foreign- Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally
Unassailable, 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 689, 705-06 (2000).
Repeal of the FCPA is not a realistic proposition. If repeal were placed
on the congressional agenda, one could only imagine opposition from all
points of the globe. If the largest and most aggressive economic competitor
in the world economy sanctioned bribery and "leveled the playing field" by
allowing bribe payments to be deducted as legitimate business expenses, the
protests would be unbridled; in fact, they would be heard in the halls of U.S.
academia.
Id. at 709.
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II. FCPA ENFORCEMENT: JUSTIFIED OR MISGUIDED?
So far, only two cases have invoked the expanded jurisdictional
provision of the FCPA, which covers foreign persons who carry out an
activity in the territory of the United States in furtherance of a corrupt
act. 71 Both of these actions highlight the jurisdictionally aggressive
joint enforcement by the DOJ and the SEC against foreign persons in
FCPA cases17 and are therefore valuable in approaching the
appropriateness of recent American enforcement of the FCPA.
The first action, settled in 2002, was brought against an Indonesian
accounting firm and one of its partners, a native Indonesian, for
bribing an Indonesian tax official for the benefit of an Indonesian
subsidiary of Baker Hughes.173 Here, American law enforcement
levied charges against foreign persons, natural and otherwise, for the
bribery of foreign officials in their own country. 17 4
The second action, settled in 2004, was brought against a Swiss
parent corporation and two of its subsidiaries, one of which was based
in America, for the bribery of oil officials in Nigeria and elsewhere. 75
As in the first case, the degree of contact with the territory of the
United States in regards to the parent corporation and the foreign
subsidiary appears minimal, at best. 176
This part begins with a fuller discussion of both cases then proceeds
to address in more detail the difficult questions of international policy
surrounding the extraterritorial application of the FCPA 77
171. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco
Gray UK Ltd. Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges (July 6, 2004) (stating that the
action against ABB Vetco Gray Inc. was only the second time charges have been
brought under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2000)), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_465.htm; see also ABB Units Plead
Guilty to Bribery, Corp. Crime Rep. No. 28(1), July 6, 2004, available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/abb070604.htm.
172. See Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at 594.
173. See infra Part II.A.
174. See infra Part II.A.
175. See infra Part II.B.
176. In the KPMG-SSH action,
[under] the facts in the public record, both the Indonesian accounting firm
and its individual partner appear to have acted entirely outside the
jurisdiction of the United States in connection with their work for Baker
Hughes. Additionally, in two instances cited in the complaint against the
company, involving payments to third-party intermediaries, the language of
the pleadings suggest that the government may have imposed something
close to strict liability for third-party actions.
Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at 595. In the later ABB action, "the DOJ's
allegations against Vetco UK [did] not suggest that Vetco UK employees undertook
any activities in the United States. Rather, the DOJ action appear[ed] to be based on
an assertion that certain Vetco US employees were acting as 'agents' for Vetco UK."
International Client Alert: ABB Affiliates Plead Guilty to Bribing Nigerian Officials,
Mondaq Bus. Briefing, Aug. 16, 2004 [hereinafter Affiliates Plead Guilty], at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=27889&searchresults=1.
177. See supra Part I.C.
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A. SEC v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono 78
The complaint against the Indonesian accounting firm KPMG
Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono ("KPMG-SSH") and senior partner
Sonny Harsono alleged the following facts: Indonesia's tax authority
notified the Indonesian subsidiary of Baker Hughes, PT Eastman
Christiensen ("PTEC"), of a $3.2 million tax liability. PTEC selected
KPMG-SSH to represent it before the authority.179 KPMG-SSH
concurred in PTEC's view that the official's tax determination was
incorrect, believing instead that PTEC was due a tax refund. 8 °
KPMG-SSH met with the Directorate General of the Indonesian
tax authority to discuss the merits of the assessment."' The tax
official demanded a payment of $200,000 in exchange for a reduction
in the assessment. 182
KPMG-SSH communicated the situation to Baker Hughes's Asia-
Pacific Tax Manager'83 ("BH Tax Manager"), who told them not to
pay the bribe, but to lawfully challenge the tax bill. 8 However, the
official would not relent, though he did lower his request to $75,000.185
Senior KPMG-SSH partner Sonny Harsono devised a plan whereby, if
Baker Hughes was willing, KPMG-SSH would pay the tax official and
conceal the payment with a false invoice for professional services
rendered. 86 KPMG-SSH candidly laid out the only two available
options to PTEC: Either contest the $3.2 million tax assessment,
which would require immediate payment of the full amount and could
take as long as two years to resolve, or pay the bribe.1
87
The BH Tax Manager relayed the details of the situation to Baker
Hughes's Vice President and Controller in Houston and to Baker
Hughes's FCPA Compliance Advisor in Washington, D.C., alerting
them that the tax official had given PTEC only forty-eight hours to
respond before he issued the $3.2 million tax assessment.8 8 The
FCPA advisor informed both the Controller and the Tax Manager
that such a payment would violate the FCPA and that KPMG-SSH
should provide written assurances that it would take no such
actions.'89
The Controller then related the situation to the General Counsel
("GC") of Baker Hughes, and to Baker Hughes's Chief Financial
178. See KPMG Complaint, supra note 1.
179. Id. para. 15.
180. Id.
181. Id. paras. 16-17.
182. Id. para. 17.
183. Id. para. 18.
184. Id.
185. Id. para. 22.
186. Id.
187. Id. para. 23.
188. Id. para. 24.
189. Id. para. 25.
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Officer ("CFO"). The GC pointed out obvious FCPA issues and
instructed the CFO and the Controller not to carry out the scheme.1 9°
Disregarding the instructions, the CFO and the Controller
authorized the illicit scheme. The tax assessment dropped to
approximately $270,000.191
Baker Hughes's GC discovered what had transpired and quickly
took corrective action.192 He attempted to stop the payment from
going forward, alerted the SEC and the DOJ, disclosed the matter to
its outside auditors, corrected the improper accounting, fired KPMG-
SSH, obtained the resignation of the responsible employees, and paid
the Indonesian government what it believed to be the correct tax
assessment: $2.1 million.193
In the fall of 2001, the SEC and DOJ for the first time jointly filed a
civil action alleging violations of the FCPA,"4 and aggressively sought
jurisdiction over Harsono and KPMG-SSH. 195 While the DOJ and the
SEC have concurrent jurisdiction over issuers, only the DOJ can
prosecute non-issuer related activity. 96 Thus, the charges brought
against Harsono and KPMG-SSH may be divided into two parts:
issuer and non-issuer related charges.
Regarding jurisdiction which extends to the conduct of issuers and
their agents, the complaint alleged Harsono violated 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
1(a),197 and that KPMG-SSH and Harsono both aided and abetted
Baker Hughes's violations of the books-and-records provisions of the
FCPA,19' as well as Baker Hughes's failure to devise or maintain an
effective system of internal controls as required to prevent or detect
such violations. 199
Bringing such charges against a foreign corporation for aiding and
abetting a U.S. company's FCPA violation was an unprecedented
190. Id. para. 27.
191. Id. para. 29.
192. Id. para. 30.
193. Id. Baker Hughes cooperated extensively with the investigation, going so far
as "declining to assert attorney-client privilege with regard to its communications
during the period of the Indonesian transaction." Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at
596.
194. See Bruch, supra note 143.
195. See Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at 597.
196. Gregory S. Bruch writes:
The FCPA divides enforcement responsibility between the [DOJ] and the
[SEC]. [The DOJ] is responsible for criminal investigations and prosecution,
as well as for civil investigation and prosecution of violations by corporations
or other business entities that are not public companies. The SEC is
responsible for civil investigation and prosecution of violations by publicly
owned companies and their agents.
Bruch, supra note 143.
197. See KPMG Complaint, supra note 1, para. 32(a).
198. Id; see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2000).
199. Id; see § 78m(b)(2)(B).
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move for the SEC.z° Presumably, if the issue had been litigated, the
foreseeable use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, in violation of § 78dd-l(a), would have been the basis of
the suit as KPMG-SSH had insisted that Baker Hughes, based in
Houston, Texas, "represent[] directly to KPMG-SSH, not through
PTEC, that it wanted KPMG-SSH to make the illicit payment.""2 1
Interestingly, however, the complaint did not point to any specific
facts, only that Harsono and KPMG-SSH directly or indirectly used
such instrumentalities.2 2
With respect to the non-issuer allegations, jurisdiction may be
exercised, after the 1998 amendments, over "any person... [who]
while in the territory of the United States, corruptly ... [does] any...
act in furtherance '' 103 of a bribe. The complaint alleged that KPMG-
SSH and Harsono violated this provision,2 the first alleged violation
of this section of the FCPA .2 ' And yet, significantly, no facts indicate
that Harsono or any KPMG-SSH employee conducted any activity
within U.S. territory. Even taking the generous legal position
identified above, where the level of conduct "includes everything
except 'merely conceiv[ing] the idea of paying a bribe without
undertaking to do so,""'2 6 neither Harsono nor any KPMG-SSH
employee acted inside U.S. territory.
Perhaps, if litigated, the government may have relied upon an
agency theory, alleging that KPMG-SSH and Harsono's conduct made
the BH Tax Manager their agent2117 who employed interstate
communications in phoning and emailing Houston. Or, it is possible
200. See Sokenu, supra note 7, at 1.
201. KPMG Complaint, supra note 1, para. 21. Recall that "use of the mail need
not have been made by the person accused," but must only have been "reasonably
foreseeable." Brown, supra note 8, at 310.
202. See KPMG Complaint, supra note 1, para. 8.
203. § 78dd-3(a).
204. See KPMG Complaint, supra note 1, para. 2.
205. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
206. Low & Trenkle, supra note 158, at 18.
207. See Dep't of Justice, USA: Phase 2, Questions Related to Phase 1, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/PhIlResp.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
The FCPA provides, "It shall be unlawful for any [issuer, domestic concern,
or other person] to make use of the mails or any other means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce ..... ... This, however, does not
require that each individual defendant personally use an interstate facility or
even authorize one to be used. Under generally applicable principles of U.S.
criminal law, a person may be held liable as a principal if he "aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures [an offense's] commission."
Although we are not aware of any case in which a court addressed this
issue with respect to the FCPA, the courts have held that the government
was not required to prove knowledge of the use of an interstate
instrumentality in cases brought under other statutes that include the use of
an interstate instrumentality as a jurisdictional element.
Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, "[t]he FCPA requires only that the use of an
interstate facility be 'in furtherance' of the unlawful payment." Id.
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that the DOJ was attempting to interpret a territorial effects-based
rationale into § 78dd-3.2 °8 However, the FCPA has never been based
upon an effects doctrine and contains no effects-based language. °9
Moreover, the OECD Convention, though it did require Congress to
greatly expand the FCPA,210 expressly relied only upon territoriality
and nationality jurisdiction.2
It may be that Harsono and KPMG-SSH could have successfully
defended themselves, 212 but "their consent to jurisdiction ensured a
quick settlement without risking financial or criminal penalties or a
protracted legal struggle, 213 instead only coming away with a cease-
and-desist order.214
While such a settlement has no controlling value as precedent, per
se, it shows the scope of the Act as it is likely to be applied going
forward and demonstrates the SEC's intention to advance all plausible
legal theories in vigorously applying the FCPA. 215  Evidently, this
action shows that American law enforcement is taking a rather
stringent approach to FCPA enforcement, even against foreign
nationals.216 Furthermore, because the SEC continues to advance its
cooperative arrangements with foreign regulators through
208. Miller & Chevalier, International Client Alert, Baker Hughes, Related Cases
Set Aggressive Precedents Under FCPA, Oct. 22, 2001 (on file with author).
209. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
210. See USA: Phase 2, Questions Related to Phase 1 Evaluation, supra note 207,
(noting that "the inclusion of the 'foreign nexus' in all three sections of the FCPA,
coupled with its explicit extraterritorial application to U.S. nationals and companies,
makes it clear that the Congress, in enacting and amending the FCPA, intended for it
to have the broadest possible scope").
211. "The United States has not yet brought any prosecution invoking the
nationality jurisdiction established by the 1998 amendments to the FCPA." Response
of the U.S.: Questions Relating to Phase 2, supra note 63, § 8.2.
212. See Sokenu, supra note 7, at 3. Claudius 0. Sokenu states:
Presumably,... the settlement relates to the DOJ's jurisdiction to institute
injunctive proceedings against "any person" violating the antibribery
provisions of the FCPA. However, that provision clearly limits the DOJ's
jurisdiction to acts committed "while in the territory of the United States."
Given that the complaint did not include any allegations that KPMG-SSH
acted "while in the territory of the United States," it is doubtful whether the
DOJ would have been able to make out a prima facie case against KPMG-
SSH.
Id. (citations omitted). Interestingly, the author of the preceding quotation was a
former senior attorney with the SEC, Division of Enforcement, and was the SEC's
lead counsel in the Baker Hughes Incorporated investigation. See id. at 1 n.*.
213. Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at 598.
214. While such an injunction "stains the [party's] name and raises the stakes for
any future violations," it results in no fine or jail time. Bruch, supra note 143.
215. See Sokenu, supra note 7, at 1; see also Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at
600-01 (describing renewed enforcement vigor for FCPA violations apparent in an
action where, for the first time, criminal liability was asserted against a foreign
national under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2000) and the expanded penalty provisions of §
78dd-2(g)).
216. See Bruch, supra note 143.
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information sharing and collaborative prosecutions,2 7 this type of
enforcement is likely to become more prevalent.218
As a result, it seems that foreign nationals may have to begin taking
the FCPA more seriously when conducting business outside the
United States or even inside their own borders.219
B. United States v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc.22 °
In late October 2003, global construction and technology giant
ABB Ltd. ("ABB"), a foreign corporation based in Zurich,
Switzerland,2 1 made public a preliminary agreement 222 to sell two of
its upstream oil, gas, and petrochemicals subsidiaries, Vetco Gray UK,
Ltd. ("Vetco UK"), based in Aberdeen, Scotland, and Vetco Gray,
Inc. ("Vetco US"), based in Houston, Texas.223
During the ensuing months of necessary due diligence, questionable
payments, totaling more than $1.1 million, were found to be made by
the subsidiaries to officials in connection with large-scale engineering
projects in Nigeria, Angola, and Kazakhstan.224  The findings were
voluntarily turned over to the SEC and the DOJ. 225 The complaint
alleged that ABB subsidiaries, Vetco US and Vetco UK, offered and
made illicit payments to government officials in these countries for the
purpose of securing and retaining business.226 The complaint stated
that at least $865,726 of such payments were made after April 2001,227
when ABB listed its American Depository Shares, thereby becoming
a reporting company in the United States.228
On July 6, 2004, the two subsidiaries pled guilty to criminal and civil
violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. 229 Thus, beyond
the civil and criminal charges brought against the parent company,
217. See supra Part I.C.
218. See Bruch, supra note 143.
219. See Sokenu, supra note 7, at 1.
220. See ABB Complaint, supra note 2.
221. Switzerland is an OECD Convention member. See Homer Moyer, The Role of
Law in Combating Official Corruption, 98 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 169, 175 (2004).
222. See Press Release, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd., ABB Concludes
Compliance Review of Upstream Oil, Gas and Petrochemicals Business (July 7,
2004), available at http://www.abb.com.
223. See ABB Complaint, supra note 2, para. 4.
224. See id. para. 1.
225. See Kim, supra note 3; Law Update: Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-
Corruption Laws, at http://www.prime-
tass.com/news/show.asp?topicid=76&id=365099 (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
226. See ABB Complaint, supra note 2, para. 1.
227. Id.
228. Foreign companies with ADRs are subject to the SEC's jurisdiction because
they are required to register with the Commission prior to offering ADRs on the
national exchanges. Officers, directors, stockholders, employees, and agents of issuers
are subject to the SEC's jurisdiction, regardless of nationality. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1
(2000).
229. See Press Release, supra note 171.
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which listed its securities in the United States, or the American
subsidiary, U.S. criminal charges were brought against a foreign
subsidiary of a foreign corporation for the bribing of foreign officials
abroad.
This represents the only other time since the KPMG-SSH action
that charges have been brought under the jurisdictional hook added in
the 1998 amendments to the FCPA.23° Interestingly, no specific "act
in furtherance" was alleged in the complaint in regards to the actions
of the foreign subsidiary, Vetco UK.23' Instead, the action presumably
was premised on the argument that Vetco US served as an agent for
Vetco UK in the bribery violations.2 32
Further, the complaint did not allege that ABB, the parent
corporation, authorized or even knew about the illicit activity of its
subsidiaries. This is noteworthy because the SEC has indicated in the
past that it will only prosecute parent corporations for knowing or
reckless violations;233 yet ABB was penalized for violating the books-
and-records provisions of the FCPA,2 34 as well as for failing to devise
or maintain an effective system of internal controls to prevent or
detect these violations.235 While the SEC has used a strict liability
theory to go after domestic U.S. corporations under the books-and-
records and the internal-accounting-controls provisions of the FCPA
for the conduct of their foreign subsidiaries, 236 this is the first time the
SEC has gone after a foreign issuer in this manner. 37
Additionally, the parent corporation was charged with criminally
violating the anti-bribery provisions "through certain of its United
230. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
231. See ABB Complaint, supra note 2.
232. See Affiliates Plead Guilty, supra note 176.
233. See Chairman Harold M. Williams, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: An Analysis, Address Before the SEC Developments
Conference of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Jan. 13, 1981),
in 46 Fed. Reg. 11,544, 11,547 (Feb. 9, 1981) (stating that the FCPA's "principal
purpose is to reach knowing or reckless misconduct").
234. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2000).
235. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
236. For example, in the following actions, it was alleged that internal controls
were insufficient and that illicit payments, if undetected, should have been detected
by more appropriate procedures. SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 1:04CV00945
(D.D.C. June 9, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm; SEC v. BellSouth Corp., No.
1:02-CV-0113 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17310,.htm; SEC v. Chiquita Brands Int'l,
Inc., No. 1:01CV02079 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17169.htm; SEC v. Int'l Bus. Machines
Corp., No. 1:00CV03040 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr16839.htm.
237. See Memorandum from Margret M. Ayres & Carlos M. Pelayo, Davis, Polk &
Wardwell, to Interested Persons (July 14, 2004) [hereinafter Davis, Polk
Memorandum] (on file with author).
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States subsidiaries." 8 The SEC has never before held a foreign issuer
criminally liable for the anti-bribery provisions absent some assertion
of scienter.239
This action, similar to the KPMG-SSH action, may well mean that
foreign corporations listing securities in the U.S. may have to pay
greater heed to FCPA strictures even in regard to their foreign
subsidiaries acting abroad. 4°
C. Is the FCPA Too Broad?
For critics of the FCPA who caution that the U.S. should be
hesitant of unduly interfering in foreign affairs without a clear U.S.
connection, the expansion of the Act represented in the cases
described above illustrates potential tensions created by
extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation.241
To critics of the 1998 amendments, "the assertion of subject matter
jurisdiction over a foreign national under the FCPA [should only be
applied] if: (1) the action was more than mere preparation; (2) the
action was material to the perpetration of the violation; and (3) it
could fairly be said that the action directly caused the violation. "242
Otherwise, even if FCPA enforcement does not, per se, violate
international rules, aggressive jurisdiction may quickly incur
"international hostility '243 as U.S. action will be perceived as
improperly dictating the internal business affairs of foreign nations.
Viewing the two cases in this light, it does not appear that the ABB
action, nor the KPMG-SSH action, allege sufficient facts to meet that
criteria.244 Indeed, specific conduct within the territory of the United
States was not alleged in either action, let alone material conduct that
could fairly be said to have caused the violation.
238. See ABB Complaint, supra note 2, para. 1.
239. See Davis, Polk Memorandum, supra note 237.
240. See Letter from Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, to Citigroup (July 27,
2004) (on file with author).
241. See Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 164, at 254.
242. Brown, supra note 8, at 328.
243. Id. at 321 (citing Restatement, supra note 120, § 403, pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A,
introductory note. This note states that "attempts by some states-notably the
United States-to apply their law on the basis of very broad conceptions of
territoriality or nationality bred resentment and brought forth conflicting assertions of
the rules of international law"); see also Salbu, supra note 11, at 285. Salbu writes:
The... presumptuous approach of the FCPA is paternalistic, invasive, and
insulting toward other nations that should be free to monitor business
transactions within their own borders. As one business consultant in
London observes, the FCPA's intrusiveness engenders "a great deal of
resentment in Europe and other places as well about U.S. efforts to
externalize U.S. law."
Id. at 283-84 (citing John Kimelman, The Lonely Boy Scout, Fin. World, Aug. 16,
1994, at 50 (stating that bribes paid by British companies are "a matter for the country
that the British company is in at the time to deal with")).
244. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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Moreover, it is worth noting that, even if the conduct in the
territorial U.S. was material, one could question the interest of the
United States in foreign bribery generally. If it were not for the
potential liability the Act creates, equity holders of corporations
listing stock in the U.S. tend, at least in the short-term, to benefit from
foreign corrupt actions. 245 While the U.S. has an interest in not
providing a safe haven for corrupt actors,246 this interest does not seem
to be implicated by minute, transient contact with U.S. territory, let
alone no contact at all. 247 For the defendants in KPMG-SSH,248 as
well as for the foreign subsidiary in ABB, 249 it seems doubtful that
sufficient minimum contacts existed to warrant personal
jurisdiction.250
If one argues that the FCPA is respectful of foreign governments
since the public official receiving the bribe is not covered under the
Act, and, moreover, that defenses are available for payors whose
actions were legal in the jurisdiction where the payment was made,251
the critique still may not be easily ameliorated. From a vantage point
suspicious of extraterritorial legislation, the tension created is not
merely that the U.S. projects civil and criminal penalties upon conduct
outside the U.S., but that the U.S. is monitoring and seeking to control
sensitive affairs host countries would prefer to govern themselves.
252
For instance, in the KPMG-SSH case, while the tax official would face
no penalty under the FCPA, the class of interactions between
Indonesia's tax authority and its clients, whether American or native,
must conform to the FCPA's standards or they risk further public
exposure and, at least on the bribe-payor's side, penalties.2 3
Beyond the potential intrusion upon a fellow nation's sovereignty,
some critics assert a culturally based critique, stating that "any form of
extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation, even the most perfectly
conceived, must be considered imprudent under the global
245. See Bruch, supra note 143 ("And while foreign governments may be harmed
by illicit payments from US public companies, they would not typically be considered
as 'other corporate constituencies."').
246. See Brown, supra note 8, at 324.
247. See id. at 326-28.
248. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Landmeier et al., supra note 115, at 598 (noting the strength of the
defendants' arguments against personal jurisdiction in the KPMG-SSH action).
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1), -2(c)(1) (2000).
252. See Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 164, at 253. Salbu argues that
regardless of how many countries eventually sign on to the present
multilateralization efforts, the attempts of one sovereign to moderate activity
within the borders of another will always pose the risk of disagreements,
resentments, and conflict. Should all the world's nations enact
extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation, the result will increase the pool of
potential international relations mine fields.
Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 164, at 445.
253. See supra Part II.A.
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conditions" of cultural variance in which we now live, 54 "particularly
given the countervailing social functions of some gratuities in one
culture that would be considered unacceptable in another. "255
Because the line between acceptable "networking" and corruption
cannot be drawn from an external vantage point,256 the FCPA cannot
help but fail.27  Broad international efforts "cannot avoid cultural
imperialism simply by virtue of their multilateralism.
258
For example, it may be the case that tax officials in Indonesia or
Nigerian oil ministers are subject to low civil-service wages, so it
becomes common to seek additional payments.2 59 How capable are
American agencies at distinguishing among various plausible
scenarios in a culturally gray area?
260
Thus, while much of the world resented perceived U.S. political
imperialism during the Cold War, nations are now likely to resent
U.S. economic imperialism. The resentment will be exacerbated
when nations fear that their culture is at risk of being supplanted by
U.S. culture. Moreover, other nations' sensitivity regarding U.S.
economic intrusiveness has become aggravated over the past few
years ....
254. Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 164, at 226.
255. Id. at 241. Salbu points out that
[t]he common and therefore presumed motivation behind a particular
behavior can differ dramatically from one cultural context to another,
making it dangerous to render facile assessments of the motives operating in
other societies... [because] our assessments are often inaccurate when we
evaluate activities from the outside, especially when our understanding of
the systems and social structures we observe is superficial.
Id. at 243.
256. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. This, however, can be seen from
another point of view: "[A] gift is given in public openly, and bribery is given illicitly
and secretly .... Shaw, supra note 170, at 690 n.10 (citing Symposium, The Role of
Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the Americas, 30 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 196, 209 (1999). Bill Shaw continues, quoting Ayodele Aderinwale, an African
Leadership director:
On the issue of giving somebody a gift, the gift is usually very small. It is a
token. It is offered, it is not demanded; it is done in the open; and when it is
too big, it becomes an embarrassment and it is returned immediately ....
And people talk about bribery as being part of the African culture ....
They perceive the typical African as a big thief .... These are some of the
fallacies people bring up in order to justify their own corrupt practices.
Id. (quoting Ayodele Aderinwale, Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in
Africa, Keynote Address to the African Leadership Forum on Corruption,
Democracy and Human Rights in Africa (Sept. 1994)).
257. See Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 164, at 251.
258. Id. at 252-53. "Yet the arbitrary line-drawing that may be acceptable
domestically, under conditions of relative cultural homogeneity, can become
unacceptable when applied extraterritorially, under conditions of relative cultural
heterogeneity." Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 164, at 430.
259. See Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and
Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis, in Corruption and the Global
Economy, supra note 86, at 85-86.
260. See Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 164, at 427.
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... In a world where U.S. flags are burned in demonstrations against
alleged U.S. arrogance and hegemony, any perception of an
overweening megalith has the potential to fuel backlash and create
an atmosphere of conflict, acts of retributive terrorism, and even
war.
261
Moreover, discretion to investigate and prosecute FCPA violations
is left entirely up to U.S. officials at the SEC and DOJ, 26 2 and their
history of discretion is not binding.263
Accordingly, bringing criminal and civil actions against foreign
nationals for bribing foreign officials when no clear action took place
within U.S. territory, and where, at least on the surface, no material
American interest is directly implicated, appears difficult to justify-
difficult, but perhaps not impossible.
D. Is the FCPA an Appropriate Approach to a Complicated, Global
Problem?
In response to critics, proponents point out that it may be incorrect
to assume that bribery is not condemned in all societies, and
dangerous to rely on this assumption to justify leaving the problem of
corruption solely to host nations a.2 ' This is especially important given
the increasingly interconnected nature of the world 265 which ties the
interests of all nations together.266 Moreover, some commentators
argue that leaving many developing nations to confront the issue
261. Id. at 442-43 (citations omitted).
262. See Ellen S. Podgor, "Defensive Territoriality": A New Paradigm for the
Prosecution of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 25
(2002).
Is it wise to leave these decisions to prosecutorial discretion? Prosecutors
have no ethical mandates specifically regarding these decisions. It is also
important to note that these decisions can have enormous impact on
international relations. Prosecutors, however, are within the executive
branch, the nucleus for making decisions related to international
relations.... Will prosecutors consider the best way to handle improprieties
in the business world from a global perspective, or will these decisions only
consider a national approach? The uncertainty in how all prosecutors will
answer this question makes the enormous discretion being given to
prosecutors a point of concern.
Id.
263. See Stephen R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change,
and Transnational Bribery, 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 657, 682 (2000). Consider: "In
applying prosecutorial discretion to cases under the FCPA, does the prosecutor
consider whether the transaction has affected competition (foreign or domestic)?
No." Response of the U.S.: Questions Concerning Phase 2, supra note 63, § 9.3.
264. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
265. See Joseph J. Norton, A "Nei International Financial Architecture?"-
Reflections on the Possible Law-Based Dtrmension, 33 Int'l Law. 891, 894 (1999).
266. See Fritz F. Heimann, Combating International Corruption: The Role of the
Business Community, in Corruption and the Global Economy, supra note 86, at 147.
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alone unfairly serves the interests of many industrialized nations who
benefit from such bribery.267
Proponents contend that leaving host nations to deal with public
corruption on their own is simply unrealistic given that many
developing economies are already heavily weighed down by
corruption's distorted social and market effects.268 Unfortunately, due
to the massive transitions that developing nations undergo, and the
bribery that often corrupts the same governmental agencies whose job
it is to police such conduct, it may be naive to expect many host
countries to effectively deal with corruption without exporting nations
policing their corporations, employees, and agents.269 In Indonesia,
for example, generous inflows of investment and aid led to disaster
because of the deep-set corruption of the Suharto regime.27 °
Following the collapse of that government,271 it might well be wise for
the U.S. to try to take a stricter approach in light of the fact that
corruption continues to expand.272
In response to critics who argue that the FCPA could, in theory,
apply to culturally sensitive areas such as gift giving, prevalent in
many societies and often straddling the boundary between social
etiquette and corruption,273 proponents may point out that typical
FCPA cases reveal bribes ranging from a hundred thousand dollars on
267. See Shaw, supra note 170, at 690 n.6 (citing Anver Versi, On Corruption and
Corrupters, Afr. Bus., Nov. 1996, at 7); see also Ala'i, supra note 85, at 905; Tarrullo,
supra note 49, at 679 (noting that at the 1994 Summit of the Americas, Latin
American countries went as far so as to "suggest that governments of developed
countries had, by failing to act against foreign bribery by their own multinationals,
become complicit in that bribery").
268. See Shaw, supra note 170, at 691.
For example, in 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank together suspended over $250 million in loans to Kenya
because of the country's inability and refusal to address bribery issues within
its government. Further, since "emerging economies have become among
the most dynamic, most influential, and therefore among the most watched
components of the global economy, fluctuations in [their] fortunes...
measurably affect the global economy."
Id. at 691-92 (citing Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39
Va. J. Int'l L. 229, 233 (1999)); see also Beverley Earle, Bribery and Corruption in
Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States: What
Is to Be Done?, 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 483, 484 (2000) ("Bribery and corruption threaten
the ability of... countries to complete their work toward privatization by distorting
the development process and discouraging private investment.").
269. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of
Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 257, 279 (1999).
270. See Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 205 (comments of Joseph Onek).
271. See id.
272. See George Moody-Stuart, Transparency Int'l, The Good Business Guide to
Bribery: Grand Corruption in Third World Development 2 (1994).
273. See Salbu, supra note 263, at 682-83 (noting that the FCPA has the potential to
affect foreigners "making small payments, or tendering small gifts, gratuities, meals,
and entertainment" and thus could punish "those small-scale items that are most
difficult to categorize as either legitimate or unlawful").
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into the millions.274  Even the lowest amounts involve tens of
thousands of dollars. 27' Thus, while enforcement agencies may have
prosecutorial discretion, 76 the amounts of the bribes in the KPMG-
SSn 2 77 and the ABB 278 actions reinforce the view that this discretion
will continue to target large-scale bribes.
III. FILLING IN THE GAPS OF ENFORCEMENT: AGGRESSIVE
ENFORCEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. Is NECESSARY TO ADDRESS
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CORRUPTION
This part argues that the broadened scope and aggressive
enforcement actions following the 1998 amendments are a desirable
approach to a pernicious global problem. Part III.A lays out the
reasons for supply-side anticorruption efforts, beginning with a more
detailed analysis of the mechanics of corruption and its negative social
and political effects, the interest of the world community in
transnational bribery generally, and the fact that bribery is universally
condemned. Part III.B points to the lack of enforcement efforts on
behalf of the major non-U.S. exporting nations. Finally, this
Comment argues that because corruption is a universally condemned
ill which should be, in part, addressed by supply-side efforts and
because the mechanisms of FCPA enforcement significantly alleviate
claims of overreaching and sovereign infringement, strict enforcement
of the FCPA is in fact desirable.
A. Public Bribery Must Be Addressed from the Supply-Side
1. Corruption's Mechanics and Its Ill Effects
Given the current interconnected global economy,279 public
corruption and its ruinous effects are of concern to all nations.280
Looked at on a macro level, valuing bribes instead of efficiency
undermines the fundamentals of the international trading system,81
deters foreign direct investment, and frustrates economic stabilization
282programs.
274. See id. at 667.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
279. See Norton, supra note 265, at 894.
280. See Heimann, supra note 266. at 147.
281. See S. Rep. No. 99-486, at 13 (1986) (statine that "bribery warps aopropriate
trade patterns and distorts the market as an efficient allocator of resources").
282. See Earle, supra note 268, at 484-85.
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2. Public Corruption's Ill Effects Concern All Members of the World
Community
As briefly described above, 83 corrupt systems inefficiently allocate
resources to "[tihose with access to vital information, connections, the
necessary cash, and a certain amount of ruthlessness -not the best
contenders. ' '284 Those who pay bribes to win contracts are also likely
to make additional illicit payments to receive further tax or regulatory
benefits to which they are not entitled.285 This process impedes
market access to those unwilling to bribe, even if they might in fact
have the most efficient goods and services.286
By obstructing foreign investment and development,287 corruption
contributes to the poverty cycle 288 as greater debt obligations
accumulate and burden future generations. 89
Bribery works its ill by creating incentives for projects to be more
numerous and expensive than necessary.290 Further, to conceal the
bribery, corrupt projects are likely to be overly complex and
inefficient, increasing costs and debt obligations further.291
Corruption also generates lesser work products, as bureaucrats can be
induced to overlook fundamental lapses in safety.29  This can
particularly impact the public if it leads to poor infrastructure built
283. See supra Part I.B.1.
284. Elliott, supra note 89, at 120; see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 42.
Although there is no necessary relationship between honesty and efficiency,
the need to pay bribes is an entry barrier. Only those who already have a
close trusting relationship with government officials and politicians may
enter the bidding. Officials may refuse to deal with those they do not know
for fear of exposure.
Id.
285. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 42.
286. See Heimann, supra note 266, at 147.
287. See Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, Fin.
& Dev., Mar. 1998, at 7 (noting that in "a recent survey of more than 150 high-ranking
public officials and key members of civil society from more than 60 developing
countries, the respondents ranked public sector corruption as the most severe
impediment to development and growth in their countries").
288. See Addressing the Challenges, supra note 23, at 1.
289. See Elliott, supra note 89, at 121; see also Heimann Testimony, supra note 81,
at 55 (noting that "[mluch of the failure of international development programs to
improve the economies of the world's poorest countries is now widely attributed to
corruption"). For example,
[Slince the fall of Suharto, [with] greater time to analyze the banking crisis
and, at least with respect to Indonesia, there is no question that corruption
played a major role. The banks in Indonesia essentially became
dysfunctional because they were making enormous loans to unproductive
enterprises that were owned by various high-level political figures (Suharto,
his relatives or others).
Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 205 (comments of Joseph Onek).
290. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 42.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 43.
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with "cheap, substandard materials in the construction of buildings or
bridges. 293
Moreover, rather than cutting through bureaucratic "red tape,"
corruption generates incentives for bureaucrats to create "delays and
unnecessary requirements as a way of inducing payoffs. '294  In this
sense, bribes operate as taxes, except they are far more uncertain and
arbitrary, and they require secrecy.29  This has the effect, even as
normal taxes do, of deterring investment.296 These effects are
cumulative and ultimately ruinous. The market crisis in Asia is a
powerful example that "discredit[s] the claim that rapid economic
growth can continue notwithstanding endemic corruption. 297
Unsurprisingly, empirical studies show that growth declines with
increased corruption, with small entrepreneurs facing particular
challenges and often marginalized.298 Studies show that if a corruption
"score" rises positively from six to eight, out of a possible ten, with ten
representing "no perceived corruption," the investment-GDP ratio
grows four percent, creating half a percent gain in annual per capita
GDP growth.299
293. Mauro, supra note 259, at 87. As some point out, corruption literally kills:
On August 17, 1999, an earthquake centered in lzmit, Turkey killed over
40,000 people. Most of the people killed were buried in kagak buildings-
"contraband" buildings whose builders had bribed their way around
Turkey's building codes. Four years earlier, in Seoul, South Korea, the
Sampoong department store collapsed, killing over three hundred and
injuring over nine hundred people. As with the kaqak buildings, the builders
of the Sampoong department store paid bribes rather than meeting local
business codes. The Sampoong department store's collapse capped three
years of disasters involving man-made constructions in Korea, in which over
one thousand lives and billions of dollars were lost due to the convergence of
negligence, inexperience, and corruption.
Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33
Cornell Int'l L.J. 627, 627-28 (2000).
The corruption that resulted in these deaths involved local business-
persons bribing local officials. Corruption, however, is no more limited by
political boundaries than are business transactions, and a significant
percentage of large bribes paid around the world are probably paid by
persons or companies that are not local. These bribes are no less harmful
because they are paid by non-local entities. Indeed, transnational bribery is
as lethal as any form of bribery, and its control is a subject worthy of study
by transnational scholars.
Id. at 628.
294. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 43.
295. See Mauro, supra note 259, at 86.
296. See id.
297. Heimann Testimony, supra note 81, at 55.
298. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 45-46.
299. See Schroth, supra note 38, at 619-20 (citations omitted).
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3. Where Does the Money Go?
Corrupt systems filter disproportionate gains to the briber and the
bribee. °° As such, "the country's wealth is distributed to insiders and
corrupt bidders, contributing to inequalities in wealth.
' 301
While it is possible in theory that the illicit funds received could be
invested wisely in the host nation, the payments generally capitalize
illegal ventures or enter foreign financial institutions in order to
remain secret.3° Moreover, in order to make up for the lost revenue,
states cut benefits and/or increase taxes. 3 3 For instance, in the
KPMG-SSH case alone, Indonesia stood to lose millions of dollars in
tax revenue had the scheme not been exposed.3 4
The inequality of resource allocation due to corruption becomes
glaringly apparent in developing nations rich in natural resources
when per capita income for average citizens remains constant despite
dramatic booms in the state's particular resource, as in Nigeria,3 °5
where ABB's subsidiaries participated in the fraud.3"
The effect of corruption may be seen as particularly unfair if
programs designed to directly aid the poor are susceptible to illicit
payments, since those with the most need will be least able to secure
access.307 From the point of view of average citizens who suffer most
acutely from corruption's effects, unwillingness on the part of
300. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 43-44.
301. Id. at 44.
302. See id. at 43-44.
303. See id. at 44.
304. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
305. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 44.
Because of its size and significance in Nigerian life, the oil and gas industry
affords numerous opportunities for corruption at various levels.
Perhaps the public initiatives are the best illustration of the effects of
corruption. Corruption has been identified as a major factor for the
ineffectiveness of community development and poverty alleviation efforts in
the oil-producing communities. "[O]ne of the most likely explanations [for
the failures of government and corporate development efforts] is the
influence of the prevalent corruption and inefficiency in Nigeria on the
conduct of government officials, oil company staff and local contractors."
OMPADEC essentially failed because of mismanagement of resources and
massive corruption. It is disturbing that even at this early stage in the
NDDC's operations, the commission is already associated with controversy
regarding its enormous expenditures on presidential politics, an issue that
has nothing to do with improving the conditions of the people in the oil-
producing areas.
Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic Development in
Nigeria: The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds, 30 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
121, 126 (2004) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
306. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
307. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 44.
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developed nations to police their end of the bribery game might itself
be perceived as a type of imperialism."'
4. Political Effects on Host Nations Delegitimizing Democratic
Governments -Entrenching Authoritarian Regimes
The harm of corruption can become greater than a matter of wasted
resources and the odious debts thereby created. 0 9 Corrupt processes
can threaten the very ability of developing nations to transition into
democratic and free-market economies.310  As governmental
legitimacy of the corrupt order becomes dangerously undermined in
the eyes of the governed,3 ' instability and even authoritarian coups
may ensue.31 2 Such pressures threaten collective security.313 This is of
particular importance to the United States and other nations who
have an interest in avoiding instability,314 which thwarts democratic
initiatives and creates a greater potential for despotic military rule.315
Perhaps worse, corruption can act as a means of entrenching un-
democratic power."' This is effectuated through selective payoffs and
favors to prominent elites, securing their favor and reducing political
competition.317
308. See Nichols, supra note 88, at 950.
309. See Elliott, supra note 89, at 121.
310. See Heimann Testimony, supra note 81, at 55. A survey by the World Bank of
3600 companies in sixty-nine countries disclosed that bribes had been paid by forty
percent of the companies. J. Lee Johnson, A Global Economy and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Some Facts Worth Knowing, 63 Mo. L. Rev. 979, 979 (1998).
311. See Shaw, supra note 170, at 706.
312. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 45.
313. See Addressing the Challenges, supra note 23, at 1.
314. See Collier, supra note 84 ("Recent empirical studies demonstrate that high
political corruption levels weaken democratic institutions, reduce foreign and
domestic investment, and slow overall economic growth.").
315. See Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 209 (comments of Joseph Onek); see
also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 31, 45. Ironically, rampant "[clorruption
helped to wipe out the Suharto" dictatorship in Indonesia due to widespread,
unfavorable press coverage of the corruption in Indonesia, aided by nongovernmental
organizations Corruption Watch and Transparency International, which led
Indonesians to demand government reform. Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 207-08
(1999) (comments of Joseph Onek). However, similar to other countries with
endemic corruption such as Nigeria,
the new Indonesian government has restraints on it. There is still a very
powerful military. To the extent that the government investigates and fully
attempts to punish past corruption, it raises the issue of whether the military
will remain in the barracks or will it attempt to overthrow the government.
Id. at 207.
316. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 86, at 45.
317. See id.
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5. Supply-Side Anti-Bribery Efforts Are Necessary
The damaging effects of corruption illustrate the importance to all
nations of addressing public corruption. As one commentator has
noted:
The crises in Asia and Russia have served as a reminder of the
interdependent international environment in which we now live.
What might have been thought of as a regional crisis in the past is
now viewed as a global crisis with far-reaching global challenges.
Closely attendant to the rapid acceleration of many countries
towards greater competition and free market capitalism is the
necessity for a change in the way these countries operate in the
global business environment.318
Understandably, curbing public corruption cannot be achieved
through any one mechanism.319 Rather, advancing this goal requires a
broad effort, targeting both the demand-side as well as the supply-
side.320
But on the supply-side, international bribery is subject to a free-
rider problem.321 So long as the players involved are not subject to
penalties, it behooves them to continue bribing rather than
competitively disadvantage themselves.322 It therefore is necessary to
create clear bribery proscriptions and follow through with
enforcement efforts.3 23  As one commentator noted: "Such action,
even if taken only by countries of the North, will have great effects in
the South as well, helping to dry up the 'supply side' of bribe
markets. 3 24
Any program to curb bribery by businesses must prohibit not only
employees from engaging in corrupt acts, but also third parties acting
on their behalf.3 25  If the FCPA could be easily circumvented by
318. George et al., supra note 168, at 25-26. George writes further:
Leaders in the [bribe] recipient nations know that in order to receive
necessary capital they will have to meet anti-corruption standards. This
provides an indirect motivation for the recipient nations to promulgate
measures that seek to reduce illicit business transactions ....
... As individual nations criminalize bribery in business transactions there
will be a reduction in the level of corruption. Only then will the world
marketplace become a level playing field which embraces the principles of
fairness and transparency and enhances confidence in the arena in which
international business and securities transactions occur.
Id. at 47-48.
319. See Heimann, supra note 266, at 148.
320. See id.
321. See Elliott, supra note 89, at 121.
322. See Tarullo, supra note 49, at 686.
323. See Elliott, supra note 89, at 121.
324. Id.
325. See Heimann, supra note 266, at 153.
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delegating the prohibited conduct to foreign agents, it would largely
be ineffectual.32 6 This is important for another reason. Considering
the cross-border complexity32 7 of international business transactions
pieced together through negotiations and communications spanning
the globe and often involving sophisticated accounting firms and
lawyers,31 it may be unreasonable to expect "[n]ascent, inexperienced
government agencies... [to] locate, investigate, and extradite bribe
authorizers situated far beyond their borders."3 9 For instance, in the
KPMG-SSH case, presumably the bribe-taking official was in breach
of Indonesian law, yet it seems that such bribery was commonplace
and went largely unpunished.33 °
If foreign officials find it difficult to effectively police their own
bureaucrats, how difficult will it be for them to police foreign
investors? Corruption is inherently difficult to control and detect
because of its secretive nature.331 Additionally, bribery often corrupts
the same governmental agencies whose job it is to police such
conduct.332
Thus, while it may seem, on the surface, imperious for the United
States to punish a native Indonesian and an Indonesian company for
bribing an Indonesian tax official, it is difficult to see how such
activity, devastating many developing countries, would have been
sanctioned were it not for Baker Hughes's fear of violating the FCPA.
Accordingly, keeping in mind the cooperative measures U.S.
enforcement agencies take,333 it may be seen that "[t]he FCPA plays a
positive role in bringing transparency to the bargaining table and
exposing corruption. Otherwise, illicit transactions would pass
unnoticed, and the informational requirements of a free market would
be further diminished." 334
326. See The Short Arm of the Law, supra note 167, at 63-65. While criticizing the
FCPA for loopholes that allow foreign subsidiaries to do the dirty work of
multinationals in jurisdictions where the host government has not signed the OECD
Convention, this article noted that the KPMG-SSH "case could push the
extraterritorial ambitions of the American authorities a bit further," id. at 64, and
begin to close the loopholes that "are big enough for a half-blind elephant to blunder
through," id. at 63.
327. See Nichols, supra note 269, at 292 ("Globalization facilitates the creation of
commercial relations with little regard for national boundaries.").
328. See supra Part II.A.
329. See Nichols, supra note 269, at 282.
330. Indonesia ranks among the most corrupt nations, receiving a score of less than
two out of ten. See Press Release, Transparency International, 2002 Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index (Aug. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2002/dnld/cpi2O02.pressrelease.en.
pdf.
331. See Heimann, supra note 266, at 148.
332. See Nichols, supra note 269, at 279.
333. See supra Part I.C.
334. Shaw, supra note 170, at 705-06.
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In light of the recent FCPA enforcement actions,335 many
international firms and businesspersons would be wise to take the
FCPA into consideration336 when conducting any business which
might conceivably create a sufficient U.S. nexus.3 7 This is a positive
development. No culture embraces corrupt practices, a proposition to
which this Comment now turns.
6. Corruption Is Universally Condemned
While cultural norms such as gift giving might be perceived, in
theory, as "corrupt" to an outsider,3 8 modern anti-bribery proponents
reject the claim that cultural contexts render universal anti-bribery
norms impossible. 3 9  Rather, "the majority of people in nearly all
cultures understand that most of the kinds of corruption... are
neither lawful nor customary.
340
It is not impossible to differentiate between conduct that is corrupt
from other cultural behaviors.34'
Giving a government official a holiday gift, even if given more in
hopes of creating goodwill than out of a genuine affection, is not
corrupt because there is no quid pro quo for misuse of office ....
On the other hand, providing an official's son with a scholarship
with the understanding that the official will award a contract to the
giver is bribery and is corrupt.342
An acceptable definition of public bribery captures this difference:
A bribe is the giving of a benefit in order to receive preferential
treatment in the form of an abuse or misuse of public power.
Further, every nation has laws proscribing bribery of its officials.3"
Indeed, it is worth noting that the FCPA is only violated if the act was
335. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 171.
336. See id. ("Companies that think they can bribe their way into overseas
contracts are sadly mistaken. Businesses that attempt to manipulate the free market
by paying off foreign officials will face serious consequences for dishonest and illegal
activity." (quoting Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray)). Some
commentators expect such prosecutions to grow because "the [DOJ] and the [SEC]
are increasing their focus on pursuing businesses and executives for FCPA violations.
The 1990's have seen large fines and, for the first time, jail time for executives
violating the Act." Savage et al., supra note 71, at 1.
337. See supra notes 158, 210, 231-37 and accompanying text.
338. See Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 164, at 430.
339. See Ala'i, supra note 85, at 904.
340. Id. (quotations omitted); see also Heimann, supra note 266, at 149 (stating that
"so-called respect for cultural diversity is usually an excuse for continuing corruption"
and that "[t]here is no country in the world where bribery is legally or morally
acceptable").
341. Nichols, supra note 88, at 870-71.
342. Id. at 870-72.
343. See id. at 870.
344. See id. at 876 & n.38 (further stating that proscription of public bribery existed
in "the most ancient laws" such as the Code of Hammurabi and the Edict of
Harmab).
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in fact illegal in the jurisdiction in which it was committed.345 While
law and morality do not always overlap,3 46 corruption is not only
universally proscribed by law, it also "is condemned ... by each of the
major religious and moral schools of thought. '' 37
At the very least, absent evidence to the contrary, assuming
universal condemnation of bribery is safer than assuming that bribery
is so socially contextual that it is not susceptible to remedy. Indeed, if
it is the case that most, if not every, society rejects corruption, then
"the willingness of Western countries to overlook bribery by their
large companies... of government officials [may itself be seen] as a
form of imperialism." '348
But even if one assumes that international public corruption is an
issue worth addressing, in part, on the supply-side through anti-
bribery legislation, it could still be argued that the U.S. nevertheless
goes too far and should content itself with minding its own citizens
and business concerns. This is subject to two rejoinders. First, other
major exporting nations have thus far failed to vigorously enforce
anti-bribery legislation adopted pursuant to international
agreement.349 Second, FCPA enforcement is unlikely to interfere
unduly with host nations because of the mechanics of enforcement
actions abroad; in fact, such actions may bolster transparent foreign
business practices and foment international cooperation on more
levels.350
B. A Lack of Incentive and Capacity, A Lack of Enforcement
While the widespread dangers of rampant public corruption
provided the political capital and motivation necessary to achieve the
broad anti-bribery agreements such as the OAS Treaty3"' and the
OECD Convention,352 "implementation of the relevant international
agreements has been limited at best" '353 while the pervasiveness of
corruption has only increased. 4
345. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
346. See Nichols, supra note 88, at 877 (describing how little notice is given to
"morals laws, [which] prohibit most forms of sexual contact").
347. Id. at 878. Additionally, leading business ethicists posit "the existence of a
universal norm for the efficient allocation and distribution of necessary social
resources," which is violated by bribery "and therefore should not be accepted in any
society." Id. at 880-81.
348. Id. at 950.
349. See infra Part II.B.
350. See infra Part III.C.
351. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec.
11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808, 818-19.
352. OECD Convention, supra note 20, 37 I.L.M. at 1.
353. Tarullo, supra note 49, at 666.
354. See Moody-Stuart, supra note 272, at 2 (stating that the incidence of
corruption has "increased tremendously" and "[w]hat used to concern a relatively
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The lack of anti-bribery enforcement on behalf of many of the
OECD members may be due to the fact that the U.S. was only able to
secure ratification but was not able to alter the "underlying game
being played by [OECD] countries.""35  Stated simply, exporting
nations stand to gain if the U.S. is subject to anti-bribery proscription
while they remain free to bribe importing nations, in practice, if not
under their law.356 In this way, OECD Convention members used
ratification of the treaty as "the least-cost way of moving the problem
out of the public eye" '357 without having to give up the competitive
advantage.
Economic self-interest is not the only explanation for the dearth of
prosecutions and investigations. One must also consider resources
and capacity. 8 "[I]t is likely to be some time before other countries
match the severe and often vigorous enforcement of the U.S.
"1359provisions.., by an expert and experienced bureaucracy ....
After all, in the world of international commerce, detecting secret,
illicit transactions taking place abroad is not easy to do.31 "[One]
need[s] very sophisticated law enforcement to do that." '361 So, it may
also be the case that the law enforcement agencies of exporting
nations, because they are not particularly designed or equipped to
tackle the task, are merely "indifferen[t] rather than resistan[t]. '362
Whatever the most persuasive rationale, or rationales, it seems
evident that obstacles for the world community's largest exporters to
effectively combat bribery persist. 363  So long as non-U.S.
multinationals do not fear prosecution, it behooves them, as rational
economic actors, to continue to carry out corrupt practices. 364
small number of people working in a relatively small number of countries has now
become a major South-wide problem").
355. Tarullo, supra note 49, at 667. "[M]any U.S. companies facing moral and/or
criminal deterrents ... evaluate the payoff for bribery as negative, making their
dominant strategy non-bribery. The dominant strategy of many multinationals from
other countries appears to have remained bribery .... "Id. at 672.
356. Id. at 674.
357. Id. at 680.
358. See id. at 683 ("The obvious explanation for the lack of prosecutions is that
OECD members lack either the will or the capacity to meet their obligations. There
are other, more benign explanations, though none is particularly convincing.").
359. Schroth, supra note 38, at 614.
360. Zemenides et al., supra note 40, at 207 (comments of Joseph Onek).
361. Id.
362. Tarullo, supra note 49, at 688.
363. See id. at 684. Transparency International's "'Bribe Payer's Index' reveals
only the most modest change during the last several years in the perception of
business experts in leading emerging markets as to the propensity for bribery of
companies from OECD Convention signatories"; a separate survey reveals that "only
one in five overseas executives of multinationals knew anything about the Convention
beyond its mere existence." Id. (citing Press Release, Transparency International,
Bribe Payer's Index 2002 (May 14, 2002), available at
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html).
364. See id. at 686.
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If this is so, in order for international anti-bribery measures to bear
fruit, broad enforcement of the FCPA as demonstrated in the KPMG-
SSH and ABB actions is necessary.
C. Cooperative Enforcement
With respect to cases in which the interests of OECD Convention
members are affected, as in the ABB action,365 the treaty's mandate
for expansive jurisdiction3 66 and maximal cooperation3 67 should serve
to alleviate aggravation. But what of nations, such as Indonesia in the
KPMG-SSH case,368 who share no such internationally binding
agreements with the U.S.?
To bolster the enforcement ability of foreign regulators as well as to
effectively enforce U.S. law, American agencies have enlisted the help
of their foreign counterparts, an engagement of growing success.
More than ever, the SEC is keenly aware of the links between US
markets and those around the world, and the importance of working
collaboratively with.., foreign counterparts. Indeed, on both the
enforcement and regulatory sides, international cooperation is
evolving into the cornerstone of the Commission's activities.
3 69
Increasing the ability of U.S. authorities to gather necessary
evidence is not the only goal in developing these arrangements.
Agencies like the SEC also advance broad cooperation and training in
the area of financial enforcement.37 The SEC has an Office of
International Affairs, whose primary purpose is to collaborate with
the Commission's foreign counterparts, providing both training and
technical assistance, especially to foreign agencies in developing
markets.371 At the time of the KPMG-SSH action, the United States
shared an information-sharing agreement with the Indonesian
government.372
To better enable this cooperative mandate, in the same year the
FCPA was last amended, Congress enacted "legislation authorizing
365. See supra Part II.B.
366. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
367. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
368. See supra Part II.A.
369. The SEC Speaks in 2004, supra note 144, at 547.
370. See Jarmer, supra note 147, at 2135.
371. See id.
372. See International Agreements and Understandings for the Production of
Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29 Int'l Law. 780, 818 (1995) [hereinafter
Mutual Assistance]. In regards to that agreement:
The Indonesian Understanding provides for communication and
cooperation on all matters relating to the operation of the U.S. and
Indonesian securities markets and the protection of investors. Both the SEC
and BAPEPAM express their commitment to use their best efforts to
provide mutual assistance to facilitate the effective administration and
enforcement of their respective securities laws and regulations.
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the SEC to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign securities
authorities.., without regard to whether the facts stated in the
request constitute a violation of U.S. law. 373 This is unusual because
states generally predicate information sharing on a basis of mutual
violation whereby the alleged conduct would have to violate the laws
of either country.374
Thus, the degree to which the SEC reaches out and works with its
foreign counterparts "not only enhance[s] the jurisdictional reach of
the SEC, but also pave[s] the way for foreign authorities" to learn and
benefit from the expertise of American regulators.375 Accordingly,
enforcement actions abroad by the SEC may lead to greater harmony
between the United States and foreign governments while avoiding
diplomatic rifts because of the requisite cooperation and free-flowing
communication involved.
Given that the cooperation from foreign law enforcement needed
by American officials is still not always easy to attain,376 and that it
takes much energy377 to prosecute abroad, it seems highly unlikely the
373. See id. at 819.
374. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922) (stating that "[t]he law does
not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be
the same .... [only that] the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions");
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903) (stating that "[t]he general principle of
international law is that in all cases of extradition the act done on account of which
extradition is demanded must be considered a crime by both parties").
375. Cohen, supra note 62, at 504. "To this end, the Exchange Act specifically
permits the SEC to conduct investigations, if so requested by foreign authorities,
regardless of whether the acts as alleged would constitute a violation of U.S. law." Id.;
see also Mutual Assistance, supra note 372, at 796.
376. See Response of the U.S.: Questions Concerning Phase 2, supra note 63, § 9.2.
The DOJ states as follows:
The chief difficulty in investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery cases
has been the lack of cooperation in obtaining evidence located outside the
United States. In some instances, to overcome a perceived lack of mutuality
or the absence of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, the Department of
Justice developed the so-called "Lockheed Agreements,"... which were
case-specific. Nevertheless, although in some cases, e.g., Niger and Syria,
countries have provided access to witnesses and extradited defendants, other
countries have not provided evidence for use in FCPA prosecutions, citing
lack of mutuality. Since the signing and subsequent ratification of the
OECD Convention by some of these countries, mutuality has become less of
an issue, although it is clearly still relevant when seeking evidence from non-
OECD countries.
Id. From this, one might infer that foreign nations have significant control over
potential prosecutions arising from conduct in their jurisdictions. Further, it also
seems reasonable that successful investigations and prosecutions on behalf of the
DOJ have been enabled by extensive cooperation between the DOJ and foreign law
enforcement.
377. See id. § 2.3. The DOJ states that
[t]he funding of FCPA investigations and prosecutions is not a separate line
item in the Department of Justice's budget. All FCPA investigations and
prosecutions are supervised by attorneys of the Criminal Division's Fraud
Section. In every budget cycle, the Fraud Section submits a budget request
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U.S. will investigate marginal or sensitive transactions that would
affront another nation.
Indeed, no official protest arose from the nations involved in the
KPMG-SSH or ABB actions. In fact, there is no empirical data
supporting the claim that the FCPA has aggrieved any nation in which
an illicit bribe was consummated and sanctioned.378
CONCLUSION
"Criminalization of transnational bribery simply involves a country
prohibiting its citizens and their employees [and agents] from
engaging in conduct in another country that is illegal, destructive,
and socially condemned" at home. This criminalization does not
constitute moral imperialism. Indeed, to allow such conduct is
morally questionable.379
The extraterritorial expansion of the FCPA depended upon the
rising awareness of international corruption's pervasive and
devastating effects. This heightened awareness shifted public opinion
away from the notion that corruption is simply an unfortunate, but
necessary cost of doing business in certain parts of the world. This
shift allowed decades of U.S. diplomatic efforts to succeed in creating
various international agreements dealing with foreign bribery.
Accordingly, in FCPA cases that implicate, for example, the interests
of fellow OECD Convention members, the U.S. may point to that
treaty's jurisdiction-friendly provisions to assuage claims of
overreaching, and likewise rely upon its mandate of maximal
cooperation to aid prosecutions. In regard to states with which the
United States does not share a formal anti-bribery treaty, American
law enforcement has quite effectively forged less formal information
sharing agreements that not only respect the foreign state's right to
control investigations within its bounds, but have also proven useful in
building professional relationships between U.S. agencies and their
foreign counterparts. Further, while prosecuting marginal conduct
might well affront social sensitivities, such as the gift-giving norm in
many Asian societies, FCPA enforcement has exclusively targeted
large-scale, socially-undesirable, and value-decreasing acts that are
universally condemned. Thus, due to a lack of enforcement on the
part of OECD members, aggressive action on the part of the U.S. is
imperative for international anti-bribery efforts to be efficacious.
Rather than viewing recent expanded and aggressive FCPA
to the Division's budget officers, and this request is incorporated into the
Department's overall budget request to Congress.
Id.
378. See Nichols, supra note 293, at 645-46 (citation omitted). Nichols observes:
"In ... twenty years, not one meaningful diplomatic rift can be attributed to
enforcement of the Act." Id. at 646.
379. Shaw, supra note 170, at 705-06 (quotations omitted).
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enforcement as morally imperious, these actions should be seen as
working to advance international partnership in addressing a complex
and entrenched problem.
Notes & Observations
